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THE LAW OF INTERPRETATION 
William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs∗ 
How should we interpret legal instruments?  How do we identify the law they create?  
Current approaches largely fall into two broad camps.  The standard picture of 
interpretation is focused on language, using various linguistic conventions to discover a 
document’s meaning or a drafter’s intent.  Those who see language as less determinate 
take a more skeptical view, urging judges to make interpretive choices on policy grounds.  
Yet both approaches neglect the most important resource available: the already applicable 
rules of law. 
Legal interpretation is neither a subfield of linguistics nor an exercise in policymaking.  
Rather, it is deeply shaped by preexisting legal rules.  These rules tell us what legal 
materials to read and how to read them.  Like other parts of the law, what we call “the 
law of interpretation” has a claim to guide the actions of judges, officials, and private 
interpreters — even if it isn’t ideal.  We argue that legal interpretive rules are 
conceptually possible, normatively sensible, and actually part of our legal system. 
This Article thus reframes the theory of statutory and constitutional interpretation, 
distinguishing purely linguistic questions from legal questions to which language offers 
no unique answer.  It also has two concrete implications of note.  It provides a 
framework for analyzing the canons of interpretation, determining whether they are 
legally valid and how much authority they bear.  And it helps resolve debates over 
constitutional “interpretation” and “construction,” explaining how construction can go 
beyond the text but not beyond the law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Read the statute; (2) read the statute; (3) read the statute!”  
Great judges tell us these are the fundamental rules of statuto-
ry interpretation.1  Their admonition reflects a standard picture of the 
interpretive process.  People often assume, usually without realizing it, 
that a judge’s job is to “read the [text] and do what it says.”2  They 
may disagree violently about how the text should be read; but if only 
we could accurately read the authors’ minds,3 or discern their purpos-
es,4 or compile the ideal legal dictionary for their time and place,5 or 
whatnot, then we’d know what to do.  The law the text enacts just is 
whatever the text says it is. 
Not everyone agrees.  A more skeptical view of interpretation, em-
bodied in recent papers by Professors Cass Sunstein and Richard  
Fallon, holds that there’s nothing that legal interpretation “just is.”6  
Instead, there are many ways to read a legal text, each with its own 
claim to authority.  And if an instrument can mean many things, then 
judges are and should be largely unbound when choosing among 
them — engaging instead in case-by-case normative balancing,7 or se-
lecting from the “capacious . . . range of approaches” whatever they 
think “makes the relevant constitutional order better rather than 
worse.”8 
Both the standard picture and the skeptical view are missing some-
thing: law.  Interpretation isn’t just a matter of language; it’s also gov-
erned by law.  This “law of interpretation” determines what a particu-
lar instrument “means” in our legal system.  Whether the written text 
actually has that meaning in any natural language, whether English, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in BENCH-
MARKS 196, 202 (1967) (quoting Justice Frankfurter). 
 2 DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL IN-
TRODUCTION 88 (1991); see also Mark Greenberg, The Standard Picture and Its Discontents, in 
1 OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 39, 48 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011) 
(describing, and critiquing, this “Standard Picture”).  We don’t mean to accuse Justice Frankfurter 
or Judge Friendly of holding the “Standard Picture” exactly, though the quote may especially res-
onate with those who do.  See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 528–35 (1947). 
 3 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Telepathic Law, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 139 (2010). 
 4 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Madison Lecture, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 245, 266 (2002). 
 5 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 3–4 (1953); Thomas W. Merrill, Essay, Textualism and 
the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 372 (1994); cf. John F. Manning, The 
New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 177–78. 
 6 Cass R. Sunstein, There Is Nothing that Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 193, 
193 (2015); accord Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications 
for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1238–39 (2015). 
 7 See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1303–05. 
 8 Sunstein, supra note 6, at 212. 
“(1) 
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Latin, or legalese, is largely beside the point.  The law says it does, and 
that’s what matters. 
As an example, think of the famous case of the two ships Peerless.9  
Two parties agreed to send cotton on the Peerless, unaware that there 
were two such ships sailing months apart (and that each party had a 
different ship in mind).  As Professor Arthur Corbin recognized, it’s 
useless to ask what the jointly authored contract really means.  The 
parties sought to convey different ideas, they invoked different public 
meanings, they had different purposes, and so on.  Even if a judge 
“knew all the circumstances that were known to both the speaker and 
the hearer, he could still give it no ‘correct’ meaning of his own.”10  
There’s just no one meaning that’s the fact of the matter. 
Yet we still have to decide the case.  We don’t keep fruitlessly hunt-
ing for a hidden meaning; but neither do we tell judges to fill the gap 
with whatever they think best.  Instead, we use law to displace our or-
dinary inquiries about meaning.  The Second Restatement of Contracts 
handles a Peerless case based on the parties’ relative degrees of fault; 
if one had reason to know the other’s meaning, we hold that extra 
knowledge against them.11  Other contract theories might handle it dif-
ferently.  Either way, we don’t need to convince ourselves that the con-
tract really means one ship or the other; the law can just treat the par-
ties as if it did. 
The crucial question for legal interpreters isn’t “what do these 
words mean,” but something broader: What law did this instrument 
make?  How does it fit into the rest of the corpus juris?  What do “the 
legal sources and authorities, taken all together, establish”?12  Ques-
tions like these presuppose some particular system of law, and their 
answers depend on the other legal rules in place.  Language will of 
course be an input to the process, but law begins and ends the inquiry.  
So, contrary to the standard picture, an instrument’s legal effect 
doesn’t just follow from the meaning of its language, according to your 
favorite set of linguistic conventions.  What to read, and what linguis-
tic conventions to use, is itself a question of law. 
Meanwhile, contrary to the skeptics, extracting legal content from a 
written instrument needn’t involve much direct normative judgment.  
In fact, it usually doesn’t.  Many of the normative choices at issue 
have already been made, as reflected in preexisting legal rules. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 Raffles v. Wichelhaus (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375; 2 Hurl. & C. 906. 
 10 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 535, at 16 (1960). 
 11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 20, 201 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Tarrant, 363 S.W.3d 508, 529 (Tenn. 2012) (applying section 20(2)(b)). 
 12 4 JOHN FINNIS, Introduction to PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: COLLECTED ESSAYS 1, 18 
(2011). 
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This paper focuses attention on these preexisting rules — rules of 
law, and not of language — that determine the legal effect of written 
instruments.  By “rules,” of course, we don’t mean that legal interpre-
tation is mechanical or simplistic; we could call them “standards,” 
“principles,” or whatever you like.  What is important is that these in-
structions are conceptually possible, normatively sensible, and legally 
part of the American system.  More controversially, they govern the in-
terpretation not only of private instruments, but also of new statutes 
and of the U.S. Constitution. 
We aren’t the first to recognize these rules as rules of law.13  For a 
long time, though, they’ve lain hidden in plain sight.  Because people 
have assumed that an interpretive rule ought to outrank whatever it 
interprets, they’ve searched for these rules in statutes, quasi-
constitutional doctrines, or the Constitution’s text.  Yet as Blackstone 
noted long ago, and as Professor Abbe Gluck has reminded us much 
more recently,14 our interpretive rules are primarily rules of unwritten 
law, even as they govern the interpretation of written law.15  Recogniz-
ing their nature and status could help clarify or resolve many existing 
disputes. 
More concretely, these insights let us clarify two of the hoariest and 
hottest debates in interpretation.  One is the role of the canons of in-
terpretation.  We provide a framework for answering endless questions 
about why the canons have authority and which putative canons are 
valid or not.  In particular, we differentiate between linguistic canons, 
which stand or fall by their accuracy in reflecting relevant linguistic 
practices, and legal canons, which stand or fall by their status in the 
legal system. 
The other is the much-ballyhooed activity of “construction.”  Re-
cent constitutional scholarship, following older scholarship in contract 
law and elsewhere, has differentiated between the “interpretation” and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 See, e.g., Helen Silving, A Plea for a Law of Interpretation, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 499, 501 
(1950); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the 
Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1907–24 (2011); see also FINNIS, supra note 12, at 18 (“These 
rules [of a legal system] must be understood not as the statements found in the texts of constitu-
tions, statutes, and judgments or judicial orders, but as the propositions which are true, as a mat-
ter of law, by reason (a) of the authoritative utterance of those statements taken with (b) the bear-
ing on those utterances and statements (and on the propositions those utterances were intended to 
make valid law) of the legal system’s other, already valid propositions.”). 
 14 See Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age 
of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753 (2013).  As we explain infra section V.A.2.a, pp. 1137–
38, we view the law of interpretation somewhat differently from Gluck, but we owe much to her 
emphasis on unwritten law. 
 15 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68 (including within the common law “the 
rules of expounding wills, deeds, and acts of parliament”).  We follow the convention of describing 
the common law as “unwritten,” though it’s of course reflected in materials (such as case reports 
or treatises) that are themselves written down.  See id. at *63–64. 
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“construction” of legal instruments.  The latter has been attacked as 
both overly wide-ranging and lacking in authority.  The law of inter-
pretation can help on both counts: it can identify the proper scope of 
an activity like construction, grounding it firmly in valid legal rules, 
while at the same time preventing it from turning into a blank check 
for policymaking.  In other words, it can make construction safe for 
law. 
Our argument proceeds as follows.  Parts I and II discuss the law 
of interpretation as a matter of theory.  Part I identifies the flaws in 
the standard picture and in the skeptics’ response, and Part II explains 
how legal rules of interpretation might cure them.  Part III then shows 
how these interpretive rules, both written and unwritten, are widely 
found in our legal system — and for good reason: they make the sys-
tem better than it otherwise would be.  Part IV discusses the implica-
tions of our theory both for the interpretive canons and for construc-
tion.  Part V answers potential objections that the law of interpretation 
is too mutable or uncertain. 
Coming to a right understanding of interpretation means carefully 
distinguishing language from law.  Throughout modern debates and 
cases, we see judges and lawyers missing this distinction.  Hopefully 
this paper will help them stop. 
I.  WHAT’S MISSING FROM THE STANDARD PICTURE 
Most recent interpretive debate, no matter how deep its disagree-
ments, has actually rested on a shared picture of the world: that legal 
interpretation is just regular interpretation, applied to legal texts.16  
This Part identifies some problems with the standard picture, both in 
practice and in theory.  It then turns to the skeptics, who recognize the 
flaws in the standard picture and conclude that judges must fill the 
gaps.  But these flaws can also be addressed by conventional legal 
rules, which routinely make contested normative judgments affecting 
society as a whole.  Understanding why we might prefer social judg-
ments to individual ones is the first step toward understanding the law 
of interpretation. 
A.  The Standard Picture 
Lawyers and judges often use “interpretation” to mean two differ-
ent things at once.  We “interpret” a written text, seen as a set of marks 
on paper, to find out the meaning of its language.  And we also “inter-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 In drawing upon Professor Mark Greenberg’s characterization and label of the standard 
picture, see Greenberg, supra note 2, we do not mean to wade into the question of whether he has 
correctly identified which philosophers actually hold the picture in its entirety.  Our interest is in 
the frequency with which the idea pops up in lawyers’ instincts and legal doctrine. 
  
1086 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 130:1079 
pret” the same text, now seen as a legal object (a “contract” or a “stat-
ute”), to find out its legal content — the changes it works in the law by 
its adoption or enactment.17  An ordinary deed to land might be ex-
pressed in perfectly ordinary language (“I grant Blackacre to A”) with 
a perfectly ordinary meaning.  At the same time, it represents a com-
plex set of normative propositions, reassigning a vast array of 
Hohfeldian incidents.18  Sometimes this second step, of identifying an 
instrument’s legal content and significance, goes by the name of “con-
struction.”19  We agree that the distinction between the two is real and 
useful; but in practice, “interpretation” often serves for both.20 
Sharing the “interpretive” label usually doesn’t cause problems, be-
cause the inferential step from ascribed meaning to legal effect is usu-
ally uncontroversial.  In many cases, the legal effect of a text is mostly 
what the text says it is.  (O grants Blackacre to A; what more do you 
need to know?)  This ease of translation gives rise to a standard pic-
ture of interpretation, which Professor Mark Greenberg helpfully 
names the “Standard Picture”: the view that we can explain our legal 
norms by pointing to the ordinary communicative content of our  
legal texts.21  On the standard picture, the point of legal interpretation 
is to discover an instrument’s meaning as a matter of language.  Once 
we have that in hand, legal effect should follow in due course.22 
The standard picture is both simple and attractive as a matter of 
theory.  The philosophy of language is capacious enough to handle key 
elements of legal practice.  It accepts, for example, that legal texts 
might be written in a technical language of “legalese,” with specialized 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 479, 480 (2013) (differentiating the “communicative content” of a text from its “legal con-
tent,” or “the legal norms the text produces”). 
 18 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judi-
cial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913). 
 19 See, e.g., Solum, supra note 17, at 483. 
 20 See Kent Greenawalt, Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 268, 274 (Jules L. Coleman, 
Kenneth Einar Himma & Scott J. Shapiro eds., 2004) (noting that lawyers often “speak of the 
meaning of a statute as conforming with how a statute should be applied”); cf. Solum, supra note 
17, at 483 (“Nothing hangs on the terminology . . . .”). 
 21 See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 48; see also Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communica-
tion? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217, 223 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 
2011) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS].  By relying on Greenberg’s account of the 
standard picture, we don’t mean to suggest agreement with the rest of his account of legal obliga-
tion, or — again, supra note 16 — to wed ourselves to his view of who precisely holds the picture. 
 22 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 
415 (1989) (describing the view that “courts should say what the statute means” as “the most 
prominent conception of the role of courts in statutory construction”); Barbara Baum Levenbook, 
Soames, Legislative Intent, and the Meaning of a Statute, in PRAGMATISM, LAW, AND LAN-
GUAGE 40, 40 (Graham Hubbs & Douglas Lind eds., 2014) (“A familiar jurisprudential view is 
that statutes have the content and apply the way the legislature intended.”). 
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vocabulary and linguistic conventions that legally trained people use to 
talk to one another.23  To the standard picture, legalese is one more 
natural language like English (or “law French”24): it’s a way of trans-
mitting meaning within a given community, a description of how actu-
al people actually speak.  Their linguistic practices don’t carry the 
force of law, but they help us interpret texts that do. 
The standard picture also has no problem with the “pragmatic” as-
pects of communication that supply what bare words lack.25  Legal 
communication has pragmatics too; our shared expectations and un-
derstandings help us avoid uncertainties and make rich inferences 
about meaning.26  Fancy-named canons like noscitur a sociis and 
ejusdem generis27 aren’t so different from maxims that guide ordinary 
speech; neither is the presumption that legislatures don’t “hide ele-
phants in mouseholes.”28 
Most importantly, the standard picture makes intuitive sense as a 
matter of legal authority.  Only some people, and not others, get to 
write legal texts.  (Only legislators can enact legislation; only a testator 
can make a will; and so on.)  Presumably there are good reasons why 
we look to those people and not others, and why those people wrote 
what they did and not something else.  So to the extent we can discov-
er what their language really means — say, by consulting an ideal dic-
tionary, or by reading their minds telepathically (as in Professor Larry 
Alexander’s celebrated hypothetical)29 — we should do it, and then 
give effect to whatever rule it prescribes.  Otherwise we’d be discard-
ing the meaning of the text they did write in favor of some other 
meaning of some other text they didn’t write.  Giving effect to any-
thing other than our best guess at linguistic meaning rides roughshod 
over all the reasons our legal system has for paying attention to that 
text in the first place.30 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 23 See Frederick Schauer, Is Law a Technical Language?, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 501 (2015).   
 24 See generally J.H. BAKER, MANUAL OF LAW FRENCH (2d ed. 1990) (describing the 
unique Anglo-French dialect spoken in medieval English courts). 
 25 See generally Andrei Marmor, Can the Law Imply More Than It Says? On Some Pragmatic 
Aspects of Strategic Speech, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 21, at 83; Lawrence 
B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1935, 1955–56. 
 26 See Timothy Endicott, Interpretation and Indeterminacy: Comments on Andrei Marmor’s 
Philosophy of Law, 10 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 46, 52–56 (2014). 
 27 See, e.g., Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 
U.S. 371, 384 (2003). 
 28 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
 29 See Alexander, supra note 3. 
 30 See id. at 143. 
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B.  Problems with the Picture 
So framed, the standard picture seems irresistible.  But there are 
serious cracks in the theory, and they’ve been growing wider over 
time.  As a matter of practice, our legal system does seem to misread 
texts quite deliberately — to apply rules and conventions on a regular 
basis that don’t track any coherent theory of linguistic meaning.  The 
more empirical research that’s done, the more our conventional legal 
rules seem to depart from the actual intentions and understandings of 
actual people.  More disturbingly, as a matter of theory, there just may 
not be a single right way to read a legal text.  Different legal systems 
might read their texts in very different ways, without any one of them 
being wrong.  And if there’s no one right way to read a given text, 
then we can’t treat the meaning of its language as the only source of 
its legal effect. 
1.  The Limits of Linguistic Guesses. — When the American legal 
system interprets a text, the process often looks nothing like a straight-
forward search for linguistic meaning.  Lawyers and judges bandy 
about a large number of so-called canons of interpretation.  These 
range from common-sense maxims like “[w]ords are to be given the 
meaning that proper grammar and usage would assign them” to ob-
scure and technical rules on the repeal of repealers.31  A recent book 
on interpretation by the late Justice Scalia and Professor Bryan Garner 
contains no fewer than fifty-seven canons32 — and there may be many 
more not included by the authors.33 
One way to understand the canons is as “linguistic habits of mind,” 
guesses about the way actual people actually speak.34  But if that’s all 
they are, many accepted rules and canons seem like bad guesses.  
Think, for example, of the rules that statutes in derogation of the 
common law are narrowly construed,35 that grants of public land favor 
the sovereign,36 that all federal laws and regulations “shall be so inter-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 31 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 140, 334 (2012); see also 1 U.S.C. § 108 (2012). 
 32 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 31, at xvi. 
 33 See Jess Bravin, Writers Bloc: Justice Scalia’s Literary Collaborator Tells All, WALL 
STREET J.: L. BLOG (July 23, 2012, 2:26 PM), h t t p : / / b l o g s . w s j . c o m / l a w / 2 0 1 2 / 0 7 / 2 3 / w r i t e r s - b l o c 
-justice-scalia%E2%80%99s-literary-collaborator-tells-all [https://perma.cc/ZNZ5-4A33]. 
 34 Manning, supra note 5, at 180; accord SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 31, at 31 (describing 
these practices as “so deeply ingrained” in legal speech that they’re “known to both drafter and 
reader alike,” and so “can be considered inseparable from the meaning of the text”); Larry Alex-
ander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory 
Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 102 n.12 (2003) (suggesting that interpretive rules may 
be “evidentiary rules of thumb” for discerning the author’s intent). 
 35 See, e.g., Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 359 (2005). 
 36 See, e.g., United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957). 
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preted” as “to stimulate a high rate of productivity growth,”37 or that 
the phrase “products of American fisheries” when used by Congress or 
administrative agencies doesn’t apply to U.S.-caught fish that were 
later filleted and frozen by non–U.S. residents in foreign territorial  
waters.38 
Even within the specialized communities of lawyers and legislators, 
real people don’t express themselves this way.  Someone who actually 
wanted to know the authors’ intended meaning, or the public’s under-
standing, or the purposes that were to be achieved, and so on, would 
never arrive at these rules in particular.  This isn’t just an armchair 
judgment; according to a recent wave of empirical scholarship, many 
of those who draft our statutes and regulations don’t know of some 
canons and openly reject others.39 
This is real trouble for the standard picture, at least if it claims to 
be a picture of American law.  Professors Abbe Gluck and Lisa 
Bressman have asked “why interpreters treat rules that they believe  
to be fictions as benign ones,”40 expressing “surprise” that courts fail to 
cite “important political science literature about congressional draft-
ing.”41  We are less surprised.  But if the standard picture is right,  
these fictions do seem indefensible.  And yet the fictions live on, regu-
larly applied by courts without any sense of legal impropriety.  This 
suggests that something else is going on. 
2.  Multiple Theories of Meaning. — Even if we decided to reform 
the canons, the better to conform to a pure vision of linguistic mean-
ing, we’d still have to decide what that vision is.  As decades of inter-
pretive debates have established, there’s more than one plausible way 
to read a text.  To put the standard picture into practice, we have to 
decide which meaning, produced by which theory of meaning, we 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 37 15 U.S.C. § 2403 (2012); see also Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Reflections on Yates and the Stat-
utes We Threw Away, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 377, 378 (2015). 
 38 1 U.S.C. § 6 (2012). 
 39 See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside — 
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 901, 936 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part I] (showing that only a small minority 
of drafters try to use terms consistently across statutes unrelated by subject matter); see also Lisa 
Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside — An Empirical 
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 755 
(2014) [hereinafter Bressman & Gluck, Part II] (showing that many drafters of criminal statutes 
failed to recognize the “rule of lenity”); Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1019 fig.1 (2015) (showing that six percent of agency rule drafters 
were unfamiliar with Chevron deference by name); cf. Aaron Nielson, What Kind of Agency Rule 
Drafter Doesn’t Know About Chevron?, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Aug. 11, 
2015), h t t p : / / w w w . y a l e j r e g . c o m / b l o g / w h a t - k i n d - o f - a g e n c y - r u l e - d r a f t e r - d o e s n t - k n o w - a b o u t 
- c h e v r o n - b y - a a r o n - n i e l s o n [h t t p s : / / p e r m a . c c / S 3 U F - 5 Z B B] (wondering where they find these  
people). 
 40 Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 39, at 915. 
 41 Id. at 917. 
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ought to pick.  Yet the standard picture doesn’t tell us that — nor can 
it. 
Consider just two popular theories of meaning: author’s intent and 
reader’s understanding.  There’s always the possibility of a gap be-
tween the two.  An author might have wanted to convey one thing, 
while a given reader, with a given amount of context, might think the 
author wanted to convey something else.42  Which of these two, if ei-
ther, is what the text really “means”? 
Many scholars have argued for one or the other.43  But neither has 
to win every time.  That’s because the right way to read a text, in a 
given circumstance, depends on our reasons for reading it in the first 
place.  To use Alexander’s example, one spouse following the other’s 
shopping list might care only about author’s intent — knowing, say, 
that “cherries” really means “cherry tomatoes.”44  But an FDA bureau-
crat reviewing a nutrition label (“Ingredients: Cherries”) would put 
aside any special knowledge of the author’s past intentions, caring only 
about what the likely future reader would understand.45  Maybe those 
understandings don’t reflect what the label “means,” just what every-
one who reads it thinks it means.46  But that seems to rule out per-
fectly standard usages of the term “means” — and in any case to be 
largely beside the point.  We need to know which aspects of the text 
the law cares about, whether or not they truly qualify as “meaning.”  
Those aspects might be different for the spouse and for the FDA bu-
reaucrat, and they might be different for us too. 
In most cases, of course, the dictionary meanings, general purposes, 
and relevant contexts are all common knowledge.  As Professor Scott 
Soames argues, “what the speaker means and what the hearers take 
the speaker to mean” are usually the same thing; competent users of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 See Greenberg, supra note 21, at 230–31. 
 43 Compare, e.g., Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
539, 540 (2013) (arguing that “our job [as interpreters] is to determine the uptake the legislator(s) 
intended us to have”), with Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Case for Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE 
OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 42, 48 (Grant 
Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) (describing the meaning of an utterance as “what the 
speaker’s meaning appears to be, given evidence that is readily available to his or her intended 
audience”). 
 44 Larry Alexander, The Objectivity of Morality, Rules, and Law: A Conceptual Map, 65 ALA. 
L. REV. 501, 506 (2013). 
 45 Accord Larry Alexander, Free Speech and Speaker’s Intent: A Reply to Kendrick, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 2 n.3 (2015) (arguing that the audience’s interpretation is relevant 
when government is regulating potentially harmful speech, while “the speaker’s intended mean-
ing” is relevant “when it comes to statutory and constitutional interpretation . . . because in those 
contexts, one is trying to ascertain the norms promulgated by those with the authority to choose 
the norms that govern us”). 
 46 Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Mean-
ing, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 22 (2015) (arguing that “[c]ommunicative content is fixed” at the 
time of writing, while “beliefs about communicative content can change” over time). 
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language rarely make severe mistakes about what their audience will 
understand.47 
But the legal system can’t limit itself to successful communications.  
It has to be able to handle unsuccessful ones too.48  For example, Su-
preme Court Justices have repeatedly disagreed about using legislative 
history to resolve ambiguities adversely to criminal defendants.49  At 
its core, this debate is about whether the authors’ or readers’ perspec-
tive controls; legislators who wrote a provision may have wanted to 
communicate something that a member of the public won’t or can’t 
reasonably know from reading the code.50  When these misfires hap-
pen, we need to know which reading wins. 
There may be good reasons for a legal system to prefer one set of 
meanings to another.  The authors are supposed to lay down rules and 
tell us what they are — so maybe their communicative intentions are 
what matter.51  Or maybe enforcing those hard-to-find intentions 
would make the law unpredictable or arbitrary, holding the audience 
responsible for things they shouldn’t be expected to know.52  As we’ve 
each argued in prior work, different societies might make those choices 
differently, whether or not they agree with your favorite theory of 
meaning.53  But no matter how sensible or silly a society’s choices, 
they’re choices made as a matter of law, and not as a matter of lan-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 47 Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A Post-Originalist Theory of Legal Interpretation, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 598 (2013). 
 48 See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. 
COMMENT. 47, 57 (2006) (noting that different theories may “overlap” in “a large range of cases,” 
but that “there may be times when different approaches will yield different answers”); cf. John 
Danaher, The Normativity of Linguistic Originalism: A Speech Act Analysis, 34 LAW & PHIL. 
397, 398–99 (2015) (arguing that invoking “success conditions” for communication can reintroduce 
hidden normative concerns). 
 49 Compare United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 298–306 (1992) (plurality opinion) (assuming 
that it may), and Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 500 n.19 (1984), with R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 
307–11 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing not), and United 
States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 437 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (at least not if the legislative 
history is “obscure”).  See also United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 67 (1994) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (noting disagreement); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 160 
(1990) (suggesting that such uses of legislative history should be rare). 
 50 See, e.g., Hillel Y. Levin, Contemporary Meaning and Expectations in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1103, 1128 (“The rule of lenity is justified by the principle that a law 
can only have force if the regulated community can reasonably understand the law . . . .”). 
 51 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 43, at 540. 
 52 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 
1997) (analogizing author’s intent to Emperor Nero’s practice of “posting edicts high up on the 
pillars, so that they could not easily be read”); Goldsworthy, supra note 43, at 47 (arguing that the 
audience’s meaning, and not the speaker’s, should control “when your utterance fails to com-
municate your meaning to your intended audience (through your fault, not theirs)”). 
 53 See William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2363–65 (2015); 
Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 
829–33 (2015). 
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guage.  As Greenberg points out, the “[p]hilosophy of language and 
Gricean theory have nothing to say about what we should deem to be 
the content of the legislature’s intentions.”54  Unless supplemented by 
something else, the standard picture leaves us at sea. 
C.  The Skeptical Response 
These flaws can provoke an extreme reaction.  Like Professor 
H.L.A. Hart’s “disappointed absolutist,” who rejects legal rules if they 
“are not all they would be in a formalist’s heaven,”55 the disappointed 
follower of the standard picture may end up rejecting meaning itself as 
a meaningful constraint. 
Fallon, for example, claims in a recent paper that there is “an 
astonishing diversity” of ways of cashing out the meaning of a legal in-
strument.56  This diversity leads him to conclude that “[i]n hard cases, 
the meaning of statutory and constitutional provisions does not exist as 
a matter of prelegal linguistic fact.”57  Fallon accepts that “distinctively 
legal norms” might in theory help determine legal meaning.58  But 
“[w]hen those standards are indeterminate” — as he claims “they typi-
cally are in disputed cases”59 — interpreters’ best option is to follow an 
“interpretive eclecticism” that makes interpretive decisions on “a case-
by-case basis.”60  Of the many possible targets of interpretation, legal 
interpreters “should choose the best interpretive outcome as measured 
against the normative desiderata of substantive desirability, consisten-
cy with rule of law principles, and promotion of political democracy, 
all things considered.”61 
Similarly, Sunstein argues that “there is nothing that interpretation 
‘just is.’”62  He identifies a long list of potential interpretive methods 
for legal documents (such as authorial intention, public meaning, 
Dworkinian moral reading, and so on),63 all of which he considers to 
be adequately “faithful to the text itself.”64  If none of these approaches 
is “mandatory” — that is, required by the philosophy of language, as 
“part of what interpretation requires by its nature” — then “[a]ny ap-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 54 Greenberg, supra note 21, at 233. 
 55 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 139 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 3d ed. 
2012). 
 56 Fallon, supra note 6, at 1239. 
 57 Id. at 1307. 
 58 Id. at 1241. 
 59 Id. at 1307. 
 60 Id. at 1308. 
 61 Id. at 1305. 
 62 Sunstein, supra note 6, at 193. 
 63 Id. at 194, 197, 202. 
 64 Id. at 200. 
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proach must be defended on normative grounds.”65  He concludes that 
“[a]mong the reasonable alternatives,” the right choice is whichever 
one “makes our constitutional system better rather than worse.”66  And 
in deciding this question, “judges and lawyers must rely on normative 
judgments of their own.”67 
Traditional rules and canons of interpretation might help fix an in-
strument’s meaning or constrain these normative choices.  But the 
canons’ uncertain status on the standard picture actually helps the 
skeptics.  If drafters in Congress don’t follow the whole-code rule, for 
example,68 but the courts do anyway, it looks like the courts are in-
venting meaning rather than enforcing it.  This may be why Fallon, 
for example, treats “reasonable meaning” (roughly, the output of the 
legal process school) and “interpreted meaning” (roughly, the output of 
stare decisis) as two more possible methods of interpretation, from 
which the interpreter may freely choose.69 
And why stop there?  If the courts are allowed to produce new 
meanings for normative reasons by using the traditional rules, then 
why can’t they produce other, normatively better meanings using oth-
er, normatively better rules?  If the canons are descriptively false as 
accounts of legislative practice, then the courts’ continued use of them 
seems to license other descriptively false approaches, too — with only 
normative preferences to guide which falsehoods the courts tell. 
II.  A TASK FOR LAW 
We share the criticisms of the standard picture, but we think this 
skepticism is a bridge too far.  Even in disputed cases, lawyers and 
judges needn’t — and usually don’t — make first-best decisions about 
political democracy, the rule of law, or even cost-benefit analysis.  In-
stead, they can and do put a great deal of effort into discerning the le-
gal standards already imposed by existing materials.  In the mine run 
of cases, they seem pretty successful at finding them.  If language 
alone can’t finish the job, as we agree it often can’t, then something 
else must.  We suggest that this something else is law. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 65 Id. at 193.  Sunstein does not specify whether those “normative grounds” are necessarily 
individual judgments or can be established at the level of legal rules.  Compare id. (“[B]oth judges 
and lawyers must rely on normative judgments of their own.”), with id. at 193 n.3 (“This is so 
even if those implicit judgments direct them to defer to, or to accept, the normative judgments of 
other people.”). 
 66 Id. at 193–94. 
 67 Id. at 193. 
 68 See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 39, at 936. 
 69 Fallon, supra note 6, at 1250–51.  It may also be why others strive to reconcile even our sub-
stantive canons and interpretive defaults with the faithful-agent model of statutory interpretation.  
See EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES 4–5 (2008). 
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Our model here is private law, which is chock full of rules for  
handling private instruments such as contracts, deeds, or wills.70  In 
some cases, these rules simply advance the parties’ private aims.  They 
might, for example, read a sales contract without a price term as call-
ing for “a reasonable price,”71 or imply warranties that match conver-
sational maxims and common experience,72 “fill[ing] in the blanks and 
oversights with the terms that people would have bargained for had 
they anticipated the problems and been able to transact costlessly in 
advance.”73  But in other cases, the interpretive rules are designed to 
advance society’s goals, whether or not they reproduce the parties’ ide-
al bargain.  If a sales contract lacks a quantity term, the Uniform 
Commercial Code may mark it zero and hold that no sale occurs.74  
Even though zero is the only quantity we know the parties didn’t 
want, the rule sometimes makes sense: it’s easy for judges to apply, it 
elicits clarity on an important point, and it may “prevent people from 
defrauding victims with whom they do not necessarily have a contrac-
tual relationship.”75  Scholars have catalogued a range of other such 
rules serving a range of other purposes — to give parties an incentive 
to be clear,76 to “enforce whatever term would be efficient in the par-
ticular case,”77 to make it difficult to disinherit one’s children,78 and so 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 70 Cf. Gluck, supra note 13, at 1970 (“Statutory interpretation, like the interpretation of con-
tracts, wills, and trusts, entails the judicial interpretation of a text previously negotiated by others.  
Many of the same overarching questions arise in each of these contexts . . . .”). 
 71 U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014); see also id. § 2-305(4) 
(providing a different result where the parties “intend not to be bound unless the price be fixed or 
agreed”); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (instruct-
ing courts to supply “a term which is reasonable in the circumstances”). 
 72 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(b)–(c) (including, as conditions for merchantability, that goods 
“are of fair average quality within the description” and “are fit for the ordinary purposes for 
which such goods are used”). 
 73 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 34 (1991); see also Omri Ben-Shahar, Essay, A Bargaining Power Theory of 
Default Rules, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 396, 396 (2009) (“The most broadly accepted principle of gap 
filling is that courts should ‘mimic the parties’ will.’” (citing Richard Craswell, Contract Law: 
General Theories, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 3–4 (Boudewijn 
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000))). 
 74 U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (providing that a contract for sale of goods for $500 or more “is not en-
forceable . . . beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing”). 
 75 Eric A. Posner, Norms, Formalities, and the Statute of Frauds: A Comment, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1971, 1986 (1996).  Professor Eric Posner argues that the zero-quantity rule is a contractual 
formality, rather than a default.  See id. at 1980–86; see also Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty 
Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563, 576 (2006).  But see Ian Ayres, Ya-
Huh: There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589, 593–94 (2006) (argu-
ing that this distinction needn’t matter).  We won’t dwell on this distinction, as the legal effect of 
the text is altered either way. 
 76 Eric A. Posner, Essay, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or 
Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 839–40 (2003). 
 77 Id. at 840. 
 78 Adam J. Hirsch, Incomplete Wills, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1423, 1438 (2013). 
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on.  Like the traditional rules and canons of interpretation, these rules 
don’t necessarily track actual linguistic usage; they’re binding on the 
parties simply because they’re the law. 
Private law can also choose among multiple theories of meaning.  
The Second Restatement generally looks to the parties’ shared under-
standing;79 but “[u]nless a different intention is manifested”80 (that is, 
“shown”81), the Restatement also gives contractual language its “gener-
ally prevailing meaning,” including a “technical meaning” for “tech-
nical terms and words of art.”82  That privileges public meaning over 
the parties’ actual intent, on the theory that the gains from standardi-
zation outweigh the costs to “parties who use[] a standardized term in 
an unusual sense” and who “run the risk that their agreement will be 
misinterpreted.”83 
The appropriate theory of meaning can change with the context.  
As Professor Caleb Nelson reports, courts at the Founding made their 
own lives easier by requiring grantors to “use the terms of art that  
the law associated with certain sorts of conveyances,” presuming that 
the language of a deed “reflected technical advice or knowledge.”84  
Hence “a Man may have Advice & Assistance in drawing of Deeds 
[a]nd it is his own Folly if he has not.”85  As to wills, though, the 
“courts took a much more forgiving approach,” recognizing “the ex-
tremity in which [wills] are often made, not admitting of counsel being 
called in.”86  These rules didn’t result from precise assessments of par-
ticular cases; they were general rules designed to advance general pur-
poses.  But the legal system frequently chooses artificial rules of inter-
pretation, and once chosen they’re the law, whether or not they reflect 
what a given text really meant. 
We argue that the same thing happens in public law.  Our law of 
interpretation helps determine the legal content of our written instru-
ments.  Using legal rules instead of (or in addition to) language may 
seem like a highly artificial way to read a text.  But it’s “artificial” in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(1) & cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (de-
scribing a search “for a common meaning of the parties, not a meaning imposed on them by the 
law”). 
 80 Id. § 202(3). 
 81 Id. § 201 cmt. a. 
 82 Id. § 202(3)(a)–(b). 
 83 Id. § 201 cmt. c; see also id. § 204 cmt. d (providing that, when facing “an omitted term,” 
the court should sometimes look beyond the parties’ intentions, “supply[ing] a term which com-
ports with community standards of fairness and policy rather than analyz[ing] a hypothetical 
model of the bargaining process”). 
 84 Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 565 
(2003). 
 85 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hawkins v. Thornton, 2 Va. Colonial Dec. B243, B244 
(Gen. Ct. 1737) (argument of counsel)). 
 86 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Kennon v. M‘Roberts, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 96, 102 (1792)).   
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the old sense of “well-crafted,” of having been “skilfully made”87 to 
achieve certain goals.  The “artificial reason” of the law, as Coke fa-
mously put it,88 offers artificial solutions to many questions in life.  
That’s as true in interpretation as it is elsewhere.89 
To the skeptics, any legal interpretive rules that we apply to public 
instruments are contingent, and so require normative justification.  In 
this they’re surely right.  Interpretive rules aren’t natural kinds; they 
depend on what law happens to be in force, and they’re as subject to 
moral assessment as any other legal rules.  But there are good reasons 
for these rules to be established at the level of law, whether written or 
unwritten — and not simply left to the normative predilections of in-
dividual judges or officials. 
After all, there are normative arguments underlying every topic in 
the law.  What should the punishment be for murder, burglary, or drug 
possession?  Should drug possession even be a crime at all?  As a socie-
ty, we have contingent legal settlements of these normative debates.  
When judges are asked to accept a plea bargain for drug possession, 
they aren’t asked to wade into the normative debate about whether 
drug possession should be a crime.  They’re asked instead to look at 
the factual basis for the charge and see whether there’s a legal settle-
ment criminalizing that conduct. 
We see this as one of the most important functions of a legal sys-
tem: to replace real answers with fake ones.  There may be real an-
swers out there to lots of important normative and policy questions, 
such as how fast we should drive on the highway, what tax policy is 
best, and so on.  But people persistently disagree on the real answers, 
and the legal system helpfully offers fake answers instead — answers 
that hopefully are somewhat close to the real ones, but on which socie-
ty (mostly) agrees and which allow us (mostly) to get along. 
So it’s a non sequitur to leap from the lack of an inherent “just is”90 
form of interpretation to direct normative judgments.  We don’t have 
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 87 Artificial (9.a), OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2008), h t t p : / / w w w . o e d . c o m / v i e w 
/ E n t r y / 1 1 2 1 1 [h t t p s : / / p e r m a . c c / 3 U L Q - L 9 D U]; cf. CHRISTOPHER WREN, PARENTALIA: OR, 
MEMOIRS OF THE FAMILY OF THE WRENS 281 (Gregg Press Ltd. 1965) (1750) (recounting 
Charles II’s praise of St. Paul’s Cathedral as “very artificial, proper, and useful”). 
 88 Prohibitions del Roy (1607) 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343; 12 Co. Rep. 63, 65; see also EDWARD 
COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND: OR, A COM-
MENTARY UPON LITTLETON, NOT THE NAME OF THE AUTHOR ONLY, BUT OF THE LAW IT 
SELFE (1608), reprinted in 2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD 
COKE 577, 701 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) (describing the common law as “understood of an 
artificiall perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience, and not of every 
mans naturall reason, for, Nemo nascitur artifex [no one is born an artisan]”). 
 89 Cf. Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reading Statutes in the Common Law Tradition, 101 VA. L. REV. 
1357, 1361 (2015) (portraying formalist approaches to interpretation as compatible with the “arti-
ficial reason” of the common law). 
 90 Sunstein, supra note 6. 
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an inherent “just is” law of narcotics, either, but judges don’t handle 
drug cases by making their own first-order normative decisions.  They 
start by looking at what judgments have already been made in the law, 
and if those judgments are conclusive, they usually stop there too. 
The same reasons why we have law in general are reasons to have 
a law of interpretation in particular.  Law fills gaps that would other-
wise be filled by the interpreter’s normative priors.  It allows us to 
agree on what our rules are precisely so that we can debate whether  
to change them.  And even if we should reform some of our law of in-
terpretation — or if we should reform some of our drug laws — that 
doesn’t mean that judges can and should initiate those reforms accord-
ing to their own normative lights. 
III.  OUR LAW OF INTERPRETATION 
If the law of interpretation is really so important, how has anybody 
missed it?  We think many scholars have been looking in the wrong 
place — looking up, to rules of ever-higher legal authority, when they 
should have been looking down, to ordinary and unremarkable rules of 
unwritten law. 
The law of interpretation is easier to justify when it’s imposed from 
above.  As to private instruments, it’s relatively uncontroversial, be-
cause private parties writing contracts or wills have to take the law as 
they find it.  If that law requires clear statements or “magic words,” or 
if it otherwise restrains the parties’ freedom to act, that’s because legis-
latures are often paternalistic to private parties. 
That model breaks down when it comes to public law.  After all, 
who has the right to be paternalistic to a legislature?  A law of inter-
pretation for statutes might seem to invade the legislature’s authority, 
denying it the power to express its will as it pleases.  So to govern  
how we read statutes, we might need rules of quasi-constitutional sta-
tus91 — and only some strange superlaw could tell us how to read the 
Constitution. 
We disagree.  A legal rule of interpretation doesn’t need to outrank 
what it interprets in order to be useful, or even to be law.  To be sure, 
it’s possible to arrange things that way: a legislature might impose in-
terpretive rules on administrative agencies, as New Mexico’s has 
done,92 or the federal government might require local communications 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 91 See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 
163–64 (2010). 
 92 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2A-1 to -20 (2016); see also UNIF. STATUTE & RULE CONSTR. 
ACT prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1995), h t t p : / / g o o . g l / g E Z g H f [h t t p s : / / p e r m a . c c / C 2 Q C 
-B6ZF].  But cf. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodo-
logical Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1845 n.359 (2010) (not-
ing that the Uniform Act is “not widely known” and of “limited utility”); Adrienne L. Mickells, 
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policies to be expressed in particular ways.93  But this outranking isn’t 
necessary.  In a common law system like ours, the rules of interpreta-
tion can also bubble up from below. 
Rather than override the lawmakers’ authority, the law of interpre-
tation creates a legal structure that enables that authority’s exercise.  
Legislatures don’t change the law in a vacuum.  Like contracting par-
ties, they act in a world already stuffed full of legal rules — some of 
which happen to be rules of interpretation.  Even omnipotent legisla-
tures, with the power to override any rule on the books, never use 
their power all at once.  In our system, at least, new enactments are 
designed to take their place in an existing corpus juris, as new threads 
in a seamless web.  As Jeremy Bentham once complained: 
At present such is the entanglement, that when a new statute is applied it 
is next to impossible to follow it through and discern the limits of its influ-
ence.  As the laws amidst which it falls are not to be distinguished from 
one another, there is no saying which of them it repeals or qualifies, nor 
which of them it leaves untouched: it is like water poured into the sea.94 
We are less worried by this than Bentham.  Integrating new law 
with old, even in a haphazard way, helps the legislature focus on par-
ticular issues and solve problems one at a time.  Default rules of inter-
pretation serve the same goals as default rules of substance: they ad-
dress recurrent issues to which the authors haven’t adverted or which 
they didn’t think necessary to address. 
Like any other rules already on the books, interpretive rules don’t 
supersede new legislation, but coexist with it.  When the legislature is 
silent, the old rules remain in effect; when it appears to override or ab-
rogate those rules, we treat its action the same way we’d treat any 
other express or implied repeal.  And because interpretive rules func-
tion just like other legal rules, they can be unwritten as well as writ-
ten, and can be applied (and often are) to the Constitution just as easi-
ly as to statutes. 
To explain our view, we first take a brief step back, exploring how 
new legislation usually interacts with existing rules of substantive law.  
(We focus on the federal system, as states may have their own ways of 
interpreting their law.95)  Our system understands that new legal rules 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Comment, The Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act: Help, Hindrance, or Irrelevancy?, 44 
U. KAN. L. REV. 423 (1996). 
 93 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (2012) (requiring that certain state or local decisions regard-
ing wireless service “be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written 
record”); T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 811–12 (2015) (requiring this 
record to be contemporaneous with the decision). 
 94 JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 236 (H.L.A. Hart ed., Univ. of London  
Athlone Press 1970) (1782). 
 95 Cf. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341 
(2010) (describing the many interpretive rules that states have adopted). 
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have to coexist with other ones already on the books.  When a problem 
tends to recur, Congress can adopt a default rule, which supplies a 
general answer until more specific provision is made. 
We then turn to interpretive rules.  Congress can establish statutory 
defaults on interpretation no less than on substance — and these con-
tinue to operate, of their own force, until expressly or impliedly re-
pealed.  These defaults help answer recurrent interpretive questions 
whenever new statutes fail to speak to the matter.  When they do, of 
course, we listen to the new statutes: interpretive rules and substantive 
ones are both subject to repeal.  But until that repeal occurs, the old 
rules continue to govern. 
This analysis applies equally to unwritten law.  Statutes of course 
trump unwritten rules, just as new statutes trump old ones.  But an 
unwritten legal rule, like an old statute, governs of its own force until 
something else abrogates it.  A common law duress defense might in-
terrupt the operation of a criminal statute, even though the statute 
outranks the defense.  A common law rule of interpretation can do the 
same.  In fact, many canons are best understood as unwritten interpre-
tive rules — setting interpretive defaults, establishing the priority of 
different sources, and instructing judges in cases of uncertainty.  Un-
written law even provides the fundamental structure of legal interpre-
tation, identifying what counts as a legal text, what role that text plays 
in our law, and how we should go about interpreting it. 
Finally, we turn to the Constitution.  Our approach provides a way 
of thinking about various theories of constitutional interpretation, and 
particularly about the role that Founding-era interpretive rules might 
play.  On some views, those rules matter only to the extent that they 
were actually contemplated by the Founders, or to the extent that they 
reflected actual linguistic usage.  They can’t matter as rules, because 
they can’t outrank the authority of the Constitution’s text.  But on our 
view, interpretive rules don’t need to be superlaw; they only need to be 
law.  The Constitution was a legal document, adopted in a world with 
legal rules of interpretation already in place, and those unwritten rules 
may well have shaped its legal content. 
A.  Written Law 
1.  Substantive Defaults. — Suppose that Congress enacts a new 
criminal statute:  
Any person who sends live geese through the mails shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 
The plain text of this statute says nothing about conspiracies, or so-
licitation, or aiding and abetting.  Yet we know that these are illegal 
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too — because we have separate statutes, written in general terms, 
that punish accessories and co-conspirators to federal crimes.96  Simi-
larly, the phrase “[a]ny person” makes no exceptions for insanity or for 
the passage of time; but we make such exceptions, under statutes that 
codify the insanity defense or the limitations period.97 
All this ought to seem obvious, but it presents a puzzle for devotees 
of the standard picture.  Maybe today’s Congress thinks the auxiliary 
offenses too broad or the statutory defenses too generous; maybe it 
would have provided different ones, or none at all, had the issues been 
freshly debated.  The statute says “[a]ny person who sends”; how do 
we know that Congress wants to exclude some people or include oth-
ers?  And if Congress doesn’t mention any of this, how can we let old 
statutes effectively trump our new one? 
One way to explain away the problem would be to shoehorn every 
relevant rule of law into a statute’s “meaning.”  We could claim, in es-
sence, that our new statute has invisible-ink extensions to conspiracies 
and accessories, invisible-ink exceptions for insanity and the limita-
tions period, and so on.  We wouldn’t need to worry about old statutes 
limiting the new, because the language of our new statute already “en-
compasses those questions,” given that “Congress enacted [it] against 
the backdrop supplied by” existing law.98 
That explanation doesn’t hold water.  We don’t usually take the in-
sanity defense or the conspiracy statute as empirical guides to what 
legislators actually had in mind when enacting a new statute — or 
what an observing member of the public would have actually thought 
they intended by it, or what its overall purposes might have been,  
or whatever.  Maybe the possibility of goose-mailing conspiracies 
wouldn’t have occurred to anyone, in Congress or out; the conspiracy 
statute applies regardless. 
So the law takes a different approach.  Instead of attributing su-
perhuman foresight to Congress — that is, instead of looking for actual 
intentions, beliefs, or understandings — it simply adds each new en-
actment to the pile, enforcing all valid statutes according to their 
terms.  In our system, legal propositions don’t have to follow the “logi-
cal model of necessary and sufficient conditions,”99 in which each new 
rule somehow addresses every situation it might someday encounter.  
We understand that new enactments will take their place in a body of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 96 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012) (aiding and abetting, solicitation); id. § 3 (accessories after 
the fact); id. § 371 (conspiracy). 
 97 See id. § 17 (insanity); id. § 3282(a) (five-year statute of limitations for noncapital offenses). 
 98 Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between Statutes and Unwritten 
Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 662 (2013) (describing this claim without endorsing it); accord  
Manning, supra note 5, at 155–56, 156 n.213. 
 99 Richard A. Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 556, 560 (1973). 
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existing law, and that some questions about a rule’s application might 
have to be answered by other parts of the law.  Individual statutes 
might have gaps, or might even conflict with one another, but the law 
remains a seamless web. 
In particular, we accept that external legal rules might not only ex-
tend new statutes (as by punishing conspiracies), but might also restrict 
them (as by providing defenses).  Our legal materials are what logi-
cians call “defeasible,”100 establishing prima facie rules that are subject 
to defeat in particular cases — and often leaving unspecified exactly 
which cases those are.101  (Ordinary speech can be defeasible too; we 
truthfully say things like “birds fly” without having to mention emus.)  
That’s why phrases like “[a]ny person” coexist peacefully with un-
named defenses: the most we get from the new statute’s language is 
that it takes subjects like mental disabilities or stale prosecutions as it 
finds them.  These other statutes keep on doing their thing, whether 
anyone adverts to them or not. 
These older statutes play the same role in our criminal law that in-
testate succession plays in the law of wills and estates: they’re general 
defaults that operate in the absence of more specific instructions.  So 
we don’t usually think of these statutes as tying Congress’s hands, any 
more than intestacy rules tie the hands of testators.  The whole point 
of a default rule is to provide an off-the-shelf solution for a recurrent 
problem until we affirmatively choose otherwise — whether “expressly 
or by fair implication.”102  If a new criminal statute needs to do some-
thing special vis-à-vis conspiracy, it can say so.  If the new statute is 
silent, existing law continues in effect.  Indeed, from the drafter’s per-
spective, the entire corpus juris looks like one big default rule — some-
thing that continues to apply in the absence of new instructions to the 
contrary. 
Far from tying the legislature’s hands, looking to the entire corpus 
juris actually frees them.  A sensible Congress can enact a conspiracy 
statute ahead of time, to avoid having to consider the problem anew 
for each separate criminal prohibition — just as it avoids having to re-
consider, say, the rules on witness tampering,103 speedy trials,104 or the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 100 Carlos Iván Chesñevar et al., Logical Models of Argument, 32 ACM COMPUTING SUR-
VEYS 337, 338 (2000). 
 101 See H.L.A. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, in ESSAYS ON LOGIC AND 
LANGUAGE 145, 147–48 (Antony Flew ed., 1951); Neil MacCormick, Defeasibility in Law and 
Logic, in INFORMATICS AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL REASONING 99, 103 (Zenon 
Bankowski et al. eds., 1995); Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1813, 1838–40 (2012). 
 102 Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 749 (2012). 
 103 See 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2012) (prohibiting witness tampering). 
 104 See id. § 3161(c)(1) (limiting pretrial delays). 
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criminal jurisdiction of the district courts.105  Default rules let legisla-
tures focus on the problem at hand (apparently, something involving 
geese and mailboxes) and not any of the other myriad problems that 
past legislatures have already tried to address.106  By passing a general 
statute on conspiracies, Congress balanced two risks: that it might for-
get something important when the next prohibition comes along, and 
that it might forget to suspend its default rule when the circumstances 
call for it.  Congress decided to put a general statute on the books, and 
it was probably right.  Denying past legislatures that power means 
denying the possibility of general legislation, or indeed of any legisla-
tion at all. 
2.  Interpretive Defaults. — Just as a legislature can establish sub-
stantive defaults on topics like conspiracies or witness tampering, it 
can also establish interpretive defaults.  These rules identify how a 
newly enacted text produces its legal effect.  As above, the rules don’t 
just make predictions about a new statute’s meaning — but neither do 
they tie the new legislature’s hands.  Instead, they’re default rules like 
any other, and they operate until the legislature says they shouldn’t. 
As a (relatively) simple example, consider the repeal-revival rule of 
1 U.S.C. § 108.  This rule addresses a problem familiar to the common 
law.  Suppose that statute A has been repealed by B, which in turn is 
repealed by C.  What happens to A?  Does it stay repealed, having 
once been taken off the books and not having been reenacted?  Or 
does it spring into force again, now that we’ve eliminated the only 
thing holding it back? 
Both views are plausible, and both seem consistent with ordinary 
and even technical understandings of the word “repeal.”  At common 
law, though, the matter was settled.  Repeal didn’t actually erase any-
thing from the statute books; A was still a law, but one in suspended 
animation, deprived of future legal effect so long as B stayed in force.  
Once B was similarly put on ice, A would naturally revive.107  In 1871, 
Congress opted for a different rule,108 abrogating the common law and 
declaring that new repeals would no longer revive old statutes “unless 
it shall be expressly so provided.”109 
That’s a stark example of the law of interpretation.  Devotees of 
the standard picture might want to reduce this provision to linguis-
tics — to an “interpretive guideline[]” that “Congress might take into 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 105 See id. § 3231 (providing jurisdiction). 
 106 See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 921, 942 (1992) (noting that “change is news but continuity is not”). 
 107 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *90. 
 108 Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 3, 16 Stat. 431, 431–32 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 108 
(2012)). 
 109 Id. at 432; see also 1 U.S.C. § 108. 
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account” in the future, “just as a Congress might very well take into 
account dictionary definitions.”110  But § 108 is a duly enacted law, 
like the general conspiracy statute — and unlike most dictionaries.  It 
lays down a legal rule, not about what the word “repeal” means, but 
about what statutes repealing things actually do.  Though § 108 con-
cerns interpretation and not substantive policy, it acts like any other 
general default, solving a recurrent problem that legislators don’t al-
ways think about in advance. 
Enacting § 108 into law also has real advantages over merely 
adopting it as a standard linguistic practice — say, by including it in a 
House drafting manual.  As enacted law, § 108 operates of its own 
force until another rule of law intervenes.  We can apply the rule even 
if we suspect that everyone was unaware of its existence; indeed, even 
if some people, including some legislators, might have predicted the 
opposite result.  That’s why “we presume that Congress is aware of ex-
isting law when it passes legislation”;111 we call this a presumption be-
cause we suspect that, in many cases, it might turn out to be false. 
This presumption is rebuttable, of course.  If a new statute’s text 
and context are clear enough to work an implied repeal, § 108’s “ex-
press[]” exception requirement is unenforceable.112  To cite an example 
offered by Professors Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash, if B did 
nothing but repeal A, the only reason to pass C and to repeal B would 
be to bring A back into force.113  In that case, the “fair implication”114 
of the statute — based on all the other tools in our legal toolbox — 
would be that A had been revived, whatever § 108 might say.  But that 
kind of implied repeal can happen to any rule of law, not just rules of 
interpretation.  If a new criminal prohibition were sufficiently sugges-
tive about conspiracies to override the general conspiracy statute, we’d 
follow its suggestion;115 that’s the point of implied repeals.  But other-
wise we keep following the rules we have. 
Section 108 is far from our only federal statutory rule of interpreta-
tion.  Consider the McCarran-Ferguson Act,116 a fundamental compo-
nent of federal insurance law that primarily acts through interpretive 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 110 Alexander & Prakash, supra note 34, at 99. 
 111 Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736, 742 (2014) (emphasis added) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 112 See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955) (refusing to require “magical passwords” for 
Congress to supersede a similar requirement); see also Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 
149 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“When the plain import of a later statute directly conflicts with 
an earlier statute, the later enactment governs, regardless of its compliance with any earlier-
enacted requirement of an express reference . . . .”). 
 113 Alexander & Prakash, supra note 34, at 99. 
 114 Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 749 (2012). 
 115 Cf. Marcello, 349 U.S. at 310. 
 116 McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012)). 
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rules.  Under that Act, “silence on the part of the Congress” in future 
statutes is construed not to interfere with state insurance regula-
tions,117 nor to preempt those regulations “unless such Act[s] specifical-
ly relate[] to the business of insurance.”118  This is only one of an 
enormous variety of interpretive provisions that Congress has enacted, 
addressing subjects from fisheries to productivity growth to the evi-
dentiary force of chapter titles in the criminal code.119 
Or consider the Dictionary Act,120 a list of global definitions for 
acts of Congress, which tells us that “oath” includes affirmation, “per-
son” includes corporations and partnerships, and so on.121  Unlike the 
medieval English Parliament, which had to revise a statute on the 
theft of “horses” to apply to the theft of a single horse,122 the Dictio-
nary Act lets us rest easy that the singular will include the plural, and 
vice versa.123  These definitions might look like rules of language, but 
having been duly enacted, they have the status of rules of law.  The 
Dictionary Act may only apply “unless the context indicates other-
wise”;124 but so do our other default rules, any of which might be over-
thrown in the future through implied repeal.  In other words, the Dic-
tionary Act is more than just a good dictionary; it’s the law. 
B.  Unwritten Law 
In a common law system like ours, rules of interpretation can also 
be found in unwritten law.  In private law, as above, this seems rela-
tively uncontroversial.  Not much turns on whether, say, the rule 
against perpetuities is codified by statute or is just good law in the 
courts; grantors have to draft around it all the same.  That’s also true 
of interpretive rules: the Second Restatement’s term-of-art provisions, 
discussed above,125 have the same impact on private contracts whether 
they’ve been adopted by legislatures or just accurately summarize the 
common law in force.  Written and unwritten rules might have differ-
ent sources or might change in different ways, but while they’re in ef-
fect, they’re just as binding. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 117 15 U.S.C. § 1011. 
 118 Id. § 1012(b). 
 119 See 1 U.S.C. § 6 (2012); Dorsey, supra note 37, at 378–81 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2403; Act of 
June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 19, 62 Stat. 683, 862); see also Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, 
Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085 (2002). 
 120 1 U.S.C. §§ 1–8. 
 121 Id. § 1. 
 122 See S.E. Thorne, The Equity of a Statute and Heydon’s Case, 31 ILL. L. REV. 202, 213 
(1936). 
 123 1 U.S.C. § 1. 
 124 Id. 
 125 See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text. 
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Unwritten rules do similar work in public law.  In fact, some of our 
most important interpretive rules are best understood as unwritten 
law.  These include not only some traditional canons of construction, 
but also the more foundational rules structuring our interpretive pro-
cess.  To see how this works, we again start with a comparison to sub-
stantive rules, before returning to rules of interpretation. 
1.  Substantive Rules. — Just as old statutes coexist with new ones, 
unwritten rules coexist with written ones.  On the civil side, statutory 
causes of action lose every day to unwritten defenses such as laches, 
waiver, or res judicata, just as they lose to written defenses like the 
statute of limitations or the statute of frauds.126  On the criminal side, 
traditional defenses such as duress, necessity, or self-defense are rou-
tinely applied by federal courts, even though they’re uncodified in the 
federal system.127  The fact that a statute’s language makes no excep-
tion for unwritten law doesn’t mean it will escape unscathed. 
The standard picture has had trouble explaining this practice, too.  
As with older statutes, some scholars have portrayed unwritten rules 
as hidden features of the statutory language.  These unwritten defens-
es, the argument goes, might be part of the “shared background  
conventions of the relevant linguistic community” on which “the mean-
ing of a text depends,”128 and “against which the legislature presuma-
bly enacted” the text in question.129  The Supreme Court has spoken 
this way in several cases,130 though it hasn’t quite agreed on how to  
fit unwritten rules into a linguistic model: the recent duress case of 
Dixon v. United States, construing the Safe Streets Act of 1968, pro-
duced four badly splintered opinions and no majority for any one  
approach.131 
We think the linguistic model is a poor fit for how these rules are 
actually understood and applied.  Presumptions about empirical facts 
such as the legislature’s use of language, the general understanding of 
the legal community, and so on, are more or less plausible in particular 
cases.  But our courts don’t use unwritten defaults as empirical heuris-
tics for interpreting new texts, any more than they use statutory de-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 126 Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (listing all five as affirmative defenses).   
 127 See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 6 (2006) (duress); United States v. Bailey, 444 
U.S. 394, 409–10 (1980) (necessity); Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 714, 720 (2013) (self-
defense); see also United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001) 
(questioning the status of common law defenses, but recognizing that they had been entertained in 
the past). 
 128 John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2467 (2003). 
 129 Id. at 2469; see also Nelson, supra note 98, at 662 (describing this as a common view). 
 130 See, e.g., Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. at 490; Bailey, 444 U.S. at 415 n.11; see 
also Nelson, supra note 98, at 753–55. 
 131 548 U.S. 1 (applying Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, and 42 U.S.C.)). 
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faults that way.  When a criminal statute is silent on the topic of insan-
ity, we don’t really know what the enacting Congress thought about 
the issue (assuming that it’s coherent to ask the question), or what 
most actual lawyers and judges would actually think after reading  
the text.  All we know is that the insanity defense is good law, and that 
the statute apparently does nothing to alter that fact. 
In the same way, we don’t really know what Congress thought 
about duress in 1968 when it enacted the Safe Streets Act.  But we do 
know that it failed to address the common law rule — and so, as five 
Justices separately suggested in Dixon, we enforce that rule as we be-
lieve it stands.132  That’s why most states,133 as well as some lower 
federal courts,134 describe these defaults for what they are: distinct 
rules of unwritten law, which act of their own force in future cases un-
less abrogated or impliedly repealed. 
Unwritten rules can affect the application of written ones without 
controlling or outranking the written text.  Though the common law 
can be abrogated, that doesn’t mean that it usually is.  When Congress 
enacts a new criminal statute, even one phrased in general terms 
(“[a]ny person”), we don’t understand it as addressing these defenses in 
particular.  Nor, as Judge Frank Easterbrook has pointed out, would 
we read its blunt language on punishment (“shall be fined under this 
title”) to “override[] the rules of evidence, the elevated burden of per-
suasion, [or] the jury.”135  The statute just identifies a new subject for 
prohibition, and then it takes other legal rules as it finds them — in-
cluding rules of unwritten law. 
Separating the roles of law and language helps avoid some of the 
confusions of the standard picture — and, indeed, of the skeptical ap-
proach.  Consider the famous example of “no vehicles in the park.”  As 
Fallon notes, that instruction, even given in a nonlegal context (say, by 
a private park owner to a gatekeeper), would never be relied on to ex-
clude ambulances.  Fallon explains this by suggesting that the phrase 
has a separate “reasonable meaning” — distinct from its semantic, in-
tended, or contextual meanings — under which ambulances are ex-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 132 See id. at 18 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (doubting “that Congress would have wanted the 
burden of proof for duress to vary from statute to statute depending upon the date of enactment,” 
and instead finding “no reason to suppose that Congress wanted to depart from the traditional 
principles for allocating the burden of proof”); id. at 19 (Alito, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring) 
(noting that Congress has “create[d] new federal crimes without addressing the issue of duress,” 
and concluding that “the burdens remain where they were” at common law); id. at 22 (Breyer, J., 
joined by Souter, J., dissenting) (calling for the application of the common law rule as it had 
“evolve[d] through judicial practice”); see also Nelson, supra note 98, at 755 n.438 (describing the 
opinions in Dixon). 
 133 See Nelson, supra note 98, at 759–61. 
 134 See id. at 756 & n.439 (citing cases from the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits). 
 135 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
1913, 1913 (1999). 
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empt.136  But the reasons to let in the ambulance have little to do with 
the phrase’s meaning.  (If the owner stopped by and asked, “any vehi-
cles in the park today?,” the gatekeeper would be lying if she answered 
“no, boss, see you tomorrow,” instead of “yes, boss, but I thought an 
ambulance would be okay.”) 
Letting ambulances into the park might be inconsistent with what 
the owner said, but it’s consistent with the rule those words estab-
lished.137  The ambulance exception isn’t part of the linguistic practic-
es of American English, but of our social practices of giving and re-
ceiving instructions.  That’s why a similar emergency would be just as 
good an excuse to violate some other instruction with entirely different 
wording — such as “fetch some soupmeat.”138  The exception reflects a 
recognized social norm (of adjusting to emergencies) that can coexist 
with other, equally defeasible rules. 
To return to the legal context, a statute forbidding “vehicles in the 
park” is similarly subject to defeat by recognized common law defens-
es.  For example, the public authority defense excuses officials for cer-
tain acts done pursuant to their duties,139 without incorporating those 
defenses as a matter of language.  (That’s why ambulances can drive 
through red lights, fire trucks can blare sirens at night, police can seize 
contraband without “possessing drugs,” and so on.140)  Fallon’s exam-
ple rests heavily on our shared intuition about the right outcome.  But 
we don’t need separate categories of meaning to explain that intuition.  
All we need is defeasibility, and the recognition that statutes don’t 
lightly override the common law. 
2.  Interpretive Rules. — Unwritten law governs interpretation no 
less than substance.  A prime example is the traditional canons of con-
struction.  These rules are partially codified in many states,141 but not 
all of the rules, and not everywhere.142  Without attempting a compre-
hensive survey, we identify three families of canons that seem highly 
unlikely to be rules of language.  Interpretive defaults assign legal con-
tent to particular phrases or types of statutes.  Priority rules rank the 
force of different legal sources.  And closure rules determine outcomes 
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 136 Fallon, supra note 6, at 1260–62. 
 137 See FINNIS, supra note 12, at 18; accord David A. Strauss, Does Meaning Matter?, 129 
HARV. L. REV. F. 94, 95 (2015) (distinguishing the instruction’s “meaning” from “what [the gate-
keeper] is required to do, considering not just the [instruction] but also all the other relevant 
facts”). 
 138 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., “Fetch Some Soupmeat,” 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2209 
(1995). 
 139 See United States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 140 Some jurisdictions have also codified some of these privileges.  See, e.g., IOWA CODE 
§ 321.231 (2016) (describing the “privileges” of a “driver of an authorized emergency vehicle”). 
 141 See generally Scott, supra note 95. 
 142 See generally Gluck, supra note 92, at 1775–82, 1798–811. 
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in cases of uncertainty.  These canons wouldn’t make much sense as 
rules of language, but they make plenty of sense as rules of law.  
(a)  Interpretive Defaults. — Just as unwritten law can establish 
substantive defaults, it can also establish default rules of interpreta-
tion.  Because these rules are unwritten, they depend to some extent on 
general practice.  That means they’re often easy to confuse with mere 
linguistic conventions, standard features of a language of legalese that 
help us make good guesses about intended or shared meanings.  For 
example, as above, the rule of the last antecedent is primarily a rule of 
legal grammar.143  The rule against “elephants in mouseholes”144 just 
applies our ordinary pragmatic maxims of conversation.145  The “lin-
guistic canons”146 of expressio unius147 or noscitur a sociis148 may have 
the sanction of long tradition, but we apply them only to the extent 
that we think they’re accurate depictions of Congress’s actual linguis-
tic practices.  Rules like these really do “describe (rather than pre-
scribe) linguistic habits of mind,” offering “a shorthand way for the 
judge to describe the mental calculation that explains his or her  
conclusion.”149 
By contrast, a legal default rule is more than a good heuristic; it 
applies of its own force.  Consider the interpretive default rule under 
which courts “read a state-of-mind component into an offense even 
when the statutory definition d[oes] not in terms so provide.”150  This 
rule applies even if we’re convinced that the enacting legislature failed 
to advert to the question (or was irreconcilably divided on it), and even 
if the text says nothing about it.  Because this “Mens Rea Canon”151 is 
already recognized as part of the law, to displace it we need “some in-
dication of congressional intent,” whether that indication is “express or 
implied.”152 
We think “unwritten law” also best describes several of the tradi-
tional canons that have been abrogated by statute.  The old repeal-
revival rule was a rule of common law before it was abolished by 
§ 108.  So was the rule that the repeal of a criminal statute abates 
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 143 Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003). 
 144 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
 145 See Endicott, supra note 26, at 52 (“The [conversational] maxims that [H.P.] Grice identified 
have obvious parallels with maxims or ‘canons’ of statutory interpretation and of other forms of 
legal interpretation.”).   
 146 See Barrett, supra note 91, at 117. 
 147 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 31, at 107. 
 148 Id. at 195. 
 149 Manning, supra note 5, at 180. 
 150 See, e.g., Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 574–75 (2009) (quoting United States v. U.S. 
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978)). 
 151 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 31, at 303. 
 152 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994). 
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pending prosecutions,153 which was abrogated by the general saving 
statute.154  And so was the rule forbidding reliance on section titles in 
interpretation,155 which was replaced by a rule allowing recourse to 
section titles,156 and which in turn has been overridden by statute for 
specific portions of the Revised Statutes and of the U.S. Code.157  
We’ve already argued (and hope it’s easy to see by now) that the stat-
utes involved here are legal rules, and not merely guesses as to mean-
ing.  But if that’s true, then the rules that those statutes abrogate also 
seem like legal rules.  Indeed, the fact that Congress thought it neces-
sary to override these rules by statute, rather than informally announc-
ing a contrary linguistic convention (such as by rewriting an internal 
drafting manual), suggests that it viewed them as rules of law, and not 
merely rules of language. 
Similarly, we think plenty of modern canons are also intended as 
interpretive defaults, not just descriptive shorthand.  And if they’re es-
tablished by unwritten law, they remain binding even if they aren’t 
ideal.  For instance, the prevailing doctrine on scrivener’s error re-
quires that errors be “absolutely clear”;158 some say a better theory 
would recognize error whenever it’s more likely than not.159  But 
whether that theory is a good idea is a different question than whether 
it’s good law. 
(b)  Priority Rules. — Complex legal systems offer plenty of op-
portunities for different rules to conflict.  How we settle these conflicts 
is a legal question, not a linguistic one: we already know what the 
rules mean, we just want to know which one wins.  Sometimes we use 
written law to settle these conflicts: the Supremacy Clause, say, ranks 
federal law over state law.160  But most of our solutions are unwritten. 
Consider the last-in-time rule, which holds that no Congress can 
bind a future Congress and that new statutes therefore trump old 
ones.161  As a matter of language, the legal system could work either 
way: both the new text and the old have a linguistic meaning, and the 
law could choose to give effect to either one.  Indeed, the problem only 
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 153 See United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 (1934). 
 154 1 U.S.C. § 109 (2012). 
 155 See Hadden v. Collector, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 107, 110 (1866). 
 156 See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998). 
 157 See, e.g., Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 19, 62 Stat. 683, 862 (addressing Title 
18); REV. STAT. § 5600, 18 Stat. 1091 (addressing the Revised Statutes generally); cf. United States 
v. Holcomb, 657 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2011) (Easterbrook, C.J.) (rejecting relevance of “language 
[that] precedes the enacting clause,” such as a statutory caption).  See generally Dorsey, supra note 
37, at 379–80. 
 158 See Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 811, 834 (2016). 
 159 See id. at 834–43. 
 160 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 161 See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872–73 (1996) (opinion of Souter, J.). 
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arises when both statutes apply by their terms.  Our legal system has 
to go beyond language to hold that the new statute wins. 
Other priority rules create special exceptions to last-in-time.  Think 
of the canon that the specific trumps the general,162 or the related can-
on against implied repeal,163 both of which preserve preexisting law as 
against new enactments.  These, too, are invoked only when both pro-
visions’ language could cover the case. 
Yet other priority rules regulate how statutes interact with external 
sources of law.  These canons are designed, as Professor David Shapiro 
notes, to favor “continuity over change,”164 fitting new statutes into an 
existing legal order.  Classic examples include the presumption that 
Congress is aware of the whole corpus juris165 and the canon against 
derogation of the common law.166  The Charming Betsy canon and  
the rule against extraterritoriality put a thumb on the scale against 
displacing international or foreign law;167 the presumption against ret-
roactivity tries to avoid changing the law applicable to past transac-
tions;168 the presumption against preemption tries to preserve state law 
intact;169 the doctrine of constitutional avoidance170 disfavors interpre-
tations that might be unconstitutional (or, nowadays, maybe-kinda-
sorta unconstitutional);171 and so on.  These canons don’t really look 
like empirical claims about language and purpose, or even about 
community usage.  Legislators today seem positively eager to violate 
international law, and the legal community knows it.172  But the  
rules continue to apply nonetheless — requiring, in the manner of rules 
against implied repeal, some affirmative indication that a prior rule is 
to be set aside.  They act more like the Dictionary Act than like a dic-
tionary, governing until abrogated by something new. 
(c)  Closure Rules. — Interpretive defaults aren’t a panacea.  
Even after we bring all our rules and canons to bear, legal language 
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 162 See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550–51 (1973). 
 163 See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 662 (2007). 
 164 Shapiro, supra note 106, at 927. 
 165 See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 281 (2003) (opinion of Scalia, J.). 
 166 See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993). 
 167 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (extraterritoriality); Murray 
v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (international law). 
 168 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265–69 (1994). 
 169 See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001). 
 170 See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–82 (2005). 
 171 See Caleb Nelson, Avoiding Constitutional Questions Versus Avoiding Unconstitutionality, 
128 HARV. L. REV. F. 331 (2015); Richard M. Re, The Doctrine of One Last Chance, 17 GREEN 
BAG 2D 173 (2014). 
 172 Cf. Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking 
the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 518 (1998) (noting “empirical evi-
dence suggesting that compliance with international law is often not the political branches’ para-
mount concern”). 
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can still be unclear.  When our tools of legal interpretation run out, 
then of course we make decisions only by drawing on other resources.  
Yet those resources might still be supplied by the law.  What we term 
“closure rules” are rules of interpretation that don’t regulate the con-
tent of any enacted text in particular, but instead tell us how to pro-
ceed in cases of uncertainty.173 
These rules are familiar in private law (consider the contra 
proferentem rule for contracts),174 and they’re found in statutory inter-
pretation too.  Public land grants are resolved favorably to the sover-
eign;175 statutes concerning Native American tribes are construed in 
the tribes’ favor;176 criminal prohibitions give way at the edges to the 
rule of lenity;177 and so on.  These rules don’t guess at meaning ab ini-
tio, so much as instruct interpreters on how to handle any remaining 
doubts.178 
Many of these closure rules resemble burdens of proof, which have 
a role to play in legal questions as well as questions of fact.179  For ex-
ample, the burden of establishing a federal court’s subject matter ju-
risdiction falls on the party invoking it.180  If, at the end of the day, the 
judge is unsure about jurisdiction — whether because the facts are un-
certain or because the relevant statute is unclear — then the case 
should be dismissed or remanded.  Likewise, it’s the plaintiff’s job to 
establish the elements of the claim,181 the defendant’s job to show that 
an affirmative defense applies,182 and so on.  In general, our system 
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 173 These rules include, but may not be strictly limited to, what Professor Adam Samaha for-
mally defines as “law’s tiebreakers.”  Adam M. Samaha, On Law’s Tiebreakers, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1661, 1665–71 (2010). 
 174 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“In choos-
ing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is 
generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a 
writing otherwise proceeds.”). 
 175 See United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957). 
 176 See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985). 
 177 See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (plurality opinion); see also Samaha, 
supra note 173, at 1714 (discussing the rule of lenity as “a powerful tiebreaker”). 
 178 See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 76 (noting that the Standard Picture is hard to reconcile 
with lenity as it “provides no reason that the determination of which aspect of linguistic content 
constitutes the law should be different in the case of criminal statutes”). 
 179 See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859 (1992); Gary Lawson, Stipulat-
ing the Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1191 (2011); see also GARY LAWSON, EVIDENCE OF THE LAW: 
PROVING LEGAL CLAIMS (forthcoming 2017). 
 180 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3522, at 
103–05 (3d ed. 2008). 
 181 Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56–57 (2005). 
 182 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 907 (2008). 
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holds that “he who asserts must prove,”183 so that burdens of persua-
sion largely track the assigned burdens of pleading.184 
These burdens are sometimes assigned by substantive rules,  
but they have clear consequences for interpretation.  When one side 
invokes a statute, it’s usually with the hope of showing that the stat-
ute supports an argument that is that side’s burden.  As Judge  
Easterbrook has noted, in cases of fatal uncertainty, “[w]hoever relies 
on the statute loses.”185  That kind of closure rule gives us a legally 
proper method of resolving the dispute — even when we don’t know 
what the statute really means, in some Platonic sense.  And when all 
else fails, we send the plaintiff home empty-handed, because the plain-
tiff bears the burden to show an entitlement to relief.186 
3.  The Structure of Interpretation. — Unwritten law does more 
than supply canons and burden-shifting rules.  It also serves as a 
foundation for our legal system’s interpretive process.  It defines the 
materials we interpret, identifies their role in our legal system, and se-
lects the interpretive approaches we bring to bear. 
(a)  Defining the Object of Interpretation. — What materials 
count as part of the written law?  The answer may seem obvious: stat-
utes, treaties, agency regulations, and so on.  Yet the issue is more 
complicated than that.  One of the most urgent debates over legislative 
history, as Professor Jeremy Waldron perceptively frames it, is whether 
committee reports or managers’ floor statements count as part of the 
material to be interpreted — whether they count as “acts of the legisla-
tors in their collective capacity,” things that Congress did or said or be-
lieved.187  Written law sometimes specifies these materials’ legal ef-
fect.188  But usually it doesn’t, leaving the question up to unwritten 
law. 
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 183 Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 411, 
425 (1996). 
 184 See Epstein, supra note 99. 
 185 Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 534 (1983). 
 186 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 56 (citing “the ordinary default rule that plaintiffs bear the risk of fail-
ing to prove their claims”).  But see Samaha, supra note 173, at 1715 (“Civil statutory interpreta-
tion lacks a universal tiebreaker that can assure decisive outcomes.”). 
 187 JEREMY WALDRON, Legislators’ Intentions and Unintentional Legislation, in LAW AND 
DISAGREEMENT 119, 146 (1999) (emphasis omitted); cf. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. 
Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 73 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing certain uses of legislative history as 
“a kind of ventriloquism,” whereby “[t]he Congressional Record or committee reports are used to 
make words appear to come from Congress’s mouth which were spoken or written by others”).   
 188 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (2012)) (“No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appear-
ing at Vol. 137 Congressional Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered legisla-
tive history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing or applying, any pro-
vision of this Act that relates to Wards Cove — Business necessity/cumulation/alternative 
business practice.” (citation omitted)); see also John F. Manning, Why Does Congress Vote on 
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Consider the following private law example.  The parol evidence 
rule holds that an integrated written agreement sweeps away the  
parties’ earlier agreements and understandings.189  As the Second Re-
statement of Contracts puts it, this isn’t merely “a rule of interpreta-
tion,” but a rule “defin[ing] the subject matter of interpretation” — 
that is, the particular aspects of the parties’ interactions that actually 
carry legal force.190  If two CEOs work out a deal on a napkin, they 
could always just sign the napkin and make that their contract.  For 
very good reasons, they don’t: they hire lawyers to rewrite the deal in 
legal language, working out details and subsidiary questions with the 
understanding that the formal document controls.  
The same thing can happen in public law.  As Gluck and Bressman 
note, members of Congress and expert committee staff typically work 
with policy ideas and “bullet points”; the draft bills are written by gen-
eralists at the Offices of Legislative Counsel.191  Some committees nev-
er even look at draft text, debating and approving plain language 
summaries instead.192  At some point before the floor vote, these sum-
maries get translated into statutory language, which almost no one in 
Congress will read; everyone relies on the committee summaries in-
stead.193  As Chief Judge Robert Katzmann suggests, members of 
Congress and their staff sometimes use this legislative history as “a ve-
hicle for details that drafters think are inappropriate for statutory 
text.”194 
The question is what to make of all this.  Gluck and Bressman 
suggest that this process “undermines the emphasis that formalists 
place on the ultimate vote on the text of the statute.”195  That conclu-
sion doesn’t follow.  Our system might give legal force to the commit-
tee proceedings, but it also might make a different choice.  For in-
stance, it might treat the committee’s summary as a type of parol 
evidence — the legislative version of the CEOs’ napkin, displaced by 
the integrated final bill.196 
Different choices have different costs and benefits, which have been 
contested elsewhere and which we won’t rehearse here.  But which 
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Some Texts but Not Others?, 51 TULSA L. REV. 559, 566 & n.52 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. 
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choice our system has in fact made is a question of law.  As Professor 
John Manning has argued, that can’t be resolved by pointing to com-
mittee practice, because the question is what force the law gives to 
that practice.197  (Similarly, even if napkin negotiations were wide-
spread, that wouldn’t resolve the force of the parol evidence rule.)  
Those are questions for our law of interpretation, perhaps informed by 
the specification of the legislative process in Article I, Section 7. 
Chief Judge Katzmann writes that “[w]hen Congress passes a law, 
it can be said to incorporate the materials that it, or at least the law’s 
principal sponsors (and others who worked to secure enactment), deem 
useful in interpreting the law.”198  Whether or not that’s true, it can’t 
be proven merely by observing staffers’ behavior.  What statutes “in-
corporate” — and who has power to “deem” things “useful” — is a le-
gal question, and it has to be answered by reference to our law of  
interpretation.199 
(b)  Identifying Written Law’s Role. — Once we know which 
written materials count, we still need to know what they count for.  As 
noted above, different societies can use written law differently.200  In a 
mostly illiterate society, a parliament might make law by oral agree-
ment, with a written record produced only afterward.  In that world, 
the oral agreement might be the law, and the reported text merely evi-
dence thereof.  Or a society could have its judges draft new laws, as in 
medieval England, so that for them the words “are little more than a 
faint and distant echo of a very real and well understood intention.”201  
(And if some unfortunate lawyer were to read the text too closely, he 
might well be told, per Lord Chief Justice Hengham, “Do not gloss the 
Statute; we understand it better [than] you do, for we made it.”202)  Or 
it might treat its statutes as setting forth presumptive or prima facie 
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 197 See John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1916 (2015). 
 198 KATZMANN, supra note 188, at 48. 
 199 Compare Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 
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 200 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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 202 Aumeye v. Abbat, YB 33 Edw. 1, Mich. (1305) (Eng.), reprinted in 5 YEAR BOOKS OF THE 
REIGN OF KING EDWARD THE FIRST 78, 82 (Alfred J. Horwood ed. & trans., 1879). 
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norms, with judges expected to depart from them in appropriate cas-
es — much the way we now treat the Sentencing Guidelines. 
What sets our society apart from these others isn’t our written stat-
utes (or written committee reports, if you prefer those).  The presence 
of a writing doesn’t tell us what the writing’s role is — whether it’s 
there to preserve the legislative bargain, to record an oral agreement, 
to refresh the judge’s recollection, to guide the exercise of discretion, or 
to do something else.  Pretty much everybody agrees that in our sys-
tem, it’s the first of these.  But that’s a consequence of an unwritten 
legal commitment, namely that written law is more than a guide or a 
mnemonic device. 
(c)  Choosing an Interpretive Approach. — Once we know what 
written law counts for, we still need to know what it says.  Here, too, 
unwritten law plays a role.  Private law sometimes commits to particu-
lar interpretive theories for particular kinds of written instruments.  As 
noted above, the Second Restatement of Contracts counsels a more 
textualist approach to recognized terms of art; older doctrines pre-
scribed more formal interpretation of deeds than of wills; and so on.203  
These commitments might be codified in particular statutes, but they 
don’t have to be, so long as they’re recognized as law. 
Our system also takes certain positions on the interpretation of 
public law.  When any two authors disagree on what they wish to con-
vey, a strict intentionalist, for example, would treat the language they 
produce as “gibberish.”204  But in the United States, this never hap-
pens.  Lawyers don’t actually cast aside any statutes after learning 
that some (or even many) legislators disagreed about their meanings.  
We don’t mean to argue that pure intentionalism is conceptually false, 
just that it’s not our conventional method of interpretation.  Neither is 
pure textualism; lawyers don’t toss aside statutes simply because 
there’s more than one linguistically acceptable public meaning of the 
text.  Nor do lawyers conclude, when a number of legislative purposes 
were at work, that any resulting statute is therefore incoherent — or, 
equivalently, that one purpose must have been the real purpose to 
which all others must yield.205  They proceed instead to the artificial 
intent, meaning, and purpose to which the law points. 
Each of these approaches has something, in theory, to be said for it.  
Textualism gives legislators an incentive to express formally what’s 
important to them.  This makes life easier for judges, who have fewer 
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 203 See supra notes 79–86 and accompanying text. 
 204 Alexander, supra note 43, at 542. 
 205 See Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (per curiam) (noting that “no 
legislation pursues its purposes at all costs,” id., and that “it frustrates rather than effectuates leg-
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places to look when trying to find the legislature’s choice.  And it 
makes life easier for the public, which can place more trust in what’s 
written down in the statute books.  On the other hand, intentionalists 
will sacrifice this formality and stability to advance the legislators’ 
more specific reasons for choosing a particular rule to communicate.  
Purposivists cast aside those specific reasons to advance the more gen-
eral goals that the legislators thought their choices were serving.  And 
there will always be future circumstances that legislators can’t foresee, 
or that pose controversies they can’t agree about; an “equity of the 
statute” approach trusts judges or other interpreters to deal with  
those circumstances appropriately, even if it means deviating from the 
text.206 
We have our own views on which of these approaches is best.  But 
this is something on which reasonable people can disagree, and so can 
reasonable societies.  Whether our system is textualist, intentionalist, 
purposivist, or something else is a legal question, to be answered by 
our sources of law — and, in the end, by the appropriate theory of ju-
risprudence.  (We assume in this Article something like Hartian posi-
tivism,207 partly for ease of exposition, though much of our framework 
should hold true on any mainstream theory.)  Legal convention might 
happen to endorse one of these “pure” theories of interpretation, but it 
also might not.  Arguments about the approaches used in our legal sys-
tem should be conducted as legal arguments, based on legal materials 
and not (or not primarily) on pure interpretive theory. 
As it happens, our legal system uses a decidedly impure approach 
to interpretation.  Consider the Court’s statement that we “presume 
that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a stat-
ute what it says there.”208  This claim presupposes that there is a “leg-
islature” that “says” and “means” things, that uses language in some-
thing like the way natural persons do.  We read a statute as if it had 
been written by a sole legislator, as if that legislator were aware of the 
whole code, as if that legislator speaks the way we speak and chooses 
words for reasons we can comprehend,209 and so on.  The legislative 
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 206 Compare John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
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John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1648 (2001) (contending that the Constitution requires faithful agency), with William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Inter-
pretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001) (arguing that the equity of the statute doc-
trine was not rejected in the early republic). 
 207 See Baude, supra note 53, at 2365 n.80; Sachs, supra note 53, at 825–26. 
 208 Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). 
 209 Cf. Manning, supra note 5, at 171 (accepting, with other textualists, that “a statute’s ulterior 
purpose may indicate the sense in which Congress used the relevant term”). 
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intent we impute might be “apparent,”210 “fictional,”211 “objectified,”212 
or “constructed,”213 but it’s still proper according to law. 
Some scholarly approaches to interpretation already make room for 
legal rules.  Certain public meaning theories, for example, focus not on 
actual understandings formed by actual members of the public, but  
on the hypothetical understanding of a “reasonable reader”214 familiar 
with all applicable legal conventions — or, more precisely, on the hy-
pothetical intentions of a “reasonable drafter”215 who was aware of 
those conventions while drafting. 
These moves can be controversial, especially as to texts from the 
distant past.  Historians such as Professors Saul Cornell and Jack 
Rakove have objected strongly to lawyers’ replacing actual figures 
from the past with constructed ones.216  But as Professors Gary  
Lawson and Guy Seidman point out, the reasonableness here is of a 
kind with other garden-variety legal constructs, such as the “reason-
able man” of tort law.217  While historical facts are of course central to 
understanding documents produced in the past, “the ultimate inquiry 
is legal”218: what impact did this particular instrument make on the 
law when it was enacted?  For that purpose, the “touchstone” of legal 
interpretation “is not the specific thoughts in the heads of any particu-
lar historical people” — whether at Philadelphia, in Congress, or in so-
ciety at large — “but rather the hypothetical understandings of a rea-
sonable person who is artificially constructed by lawyers.”219  The 
fiction is useful because it’s a legal fiction, built by our legal rules.220 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 210 Andrew S. Gold, Absurd Results, Scrivener’s Errors, and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 25, 33 (2006). 
 211 Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 
2017) (manuscript at 1), http://ssrn.com/id=2823751 [https://perma.cc/CN45-WMW3]. 
 212 SCALIA, supra note 52, at 17 (urging a search for “the intent that a reasonable person would 
gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris”). 
 213 Lawson & Seidman, supra note 48, at 61–67; see also Gary Lawson, Commentary, No Histo-
ry, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 
FLA. L. REV. 1551, 1558–59 (2012) (reiterating this position). 
 214 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 31, at 33. 
 215 See Cory R. Liu, Note, Textualism and the Presumption of Reasonable Drafting, 38 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 711, 722 (2015). 
 216 See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: 
The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 735 (2013) (argu-
ing that many scholars have “unconsciously poured their own ideological prejudices into the ideal 
readers they constructed”); Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, The 
Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 586 (2011) (describing the 
“imaginary disinterested original reader of the Constitution” as “nothing more nor less than a 
creature of the modern originalist jurist’s imagination”). 
 217 Lawson & Seidman, supra note 48, at 47 & n.3. 
 218 Id. at 48. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Professor Richard Ekins argues that legislatures really do have intentions, products of joint 
standing intentions “to legislate like a reasonable sole legislator,” RICHARD EKINS, THE NA-
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C.  Interpretive Rules and the Constitution 
Thus far, our discussion of public law has focused on statutes.  But 
interpretive rules can apply to constitutional text as well.  The Consti-
tution is a written instrument, and to determine its legal effect, we 
have to call on the law of interpretation. 
As regards the Constitution, only a very small part of our interpre-
tive law is written.  We can find a few explicit rules of construction in 
the Territories Clause of Article IV,221 as well as in the Ninth,222 Elev-
enth,223 and Seventeenth Amendments.224  But that’s about it.225  
Congress hasn’t tried to legislate rules of constitutional interpretation, 
and as discussed below, its power to do so is far from clear.  This 
leaves a great deal of constitutional interpretation up to unwritten law. 
Consider United States v. Chambers, the case of an indicted boot-
legger whose guilty plea hadn’t reached final judgment when Prohibi-
tion ended.226  At common law, repealing a criminal statute would 
abate a pending prosecution.227  With the underlying statute gone, the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
TURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 236 (2012), and “to change the [law] when there is good reason 
to do so,” id. at 219.  What legislators share when they legislate is simply the intention to adopt, if 
it gets enough votes, a particular proposal to change the law.  See Richard Ekins & Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy, The Reality and Indispensability of Legislative Intentions, 36 SYDNEY L. REV. 39, 
67 (2014).  If this account is right, then in this situation there isn’t much difference between the 
legal fiction and the reality. 
 221 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“[N]othing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to 
Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.”). 
 222 Id. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”); see William Baude, Rethinking the 
Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1742, 1796–98 (2013) (discussing the Ninth 
Amendment); see also Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 895 (2008); Ryan C. Williams, The Ninth Amendment as a Rule of Construction, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. 498 (2011). 
 223 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”); see Kurt T. Lash, 
Leaving the Chisholm Trail: The Eleventh Amendment and the Background Principle of Strict 
Construction, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1577, 1695 (2009); Steven Menashi, Article III as a Con-
stitutional Compromise: Modern Textualism and State Sovereign Immunity, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1135, 1184 (2009). 
 224 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 3 (“This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the 
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.”).   
 225 But see Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis for 
Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607 (2009) (seeking to distill other inter-
pretive rules from the text); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its 
Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (2009) (same). 
 226 291 U.S. 217, 221–22 (1934).  Chambers’s co-conspirator was set to go to trial and demurred 
once Prohibition ended.  Id.  We are indebted for this example to Professor John Harrison. 
 227 See id. at 223; Yeaton v. United States, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 281, 283 (1809) (“[I]f no sentence 
had been pronounced, it has been long settled, on general principles, that after the expiration or 
repeal of a law, no penalty can be enforced, nor punishment inflicted, for violations of the law 
committed while it was in force, unless some special provision be made . . . .”). 
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court lost its power to punish the offense, even though the defendant’s 
actions were wholly illegal when performed.  In 1871, Congress abro-
gated this rule by passing the general savings statute.228  But as the 
Supreme Court noted in Chambers, that statutory rule of interpretation 
“applies, and could only apply, to the repeal of statutes by the Con-
gress.”229  When the Twenty-First Amendment repealed the Eighteenth 
and pulled the constitutional rug out from under Prohibition, there 
was no constitutional savings provision to keep the prosecutions going.  
And because Congress couldn’t extend its own power to punish viola-
tors, the common law abatement rule applied in its stead. 
What’s most interesting for our purposes is how the Court de-
scribed its ruling in Chambers.  The Court didn’t try to offer a judicial 
gloss on the text itself; it didn’t say, for example, that the limited enu-
meration of Article I simply requires a certain approach to repeals.  
That would be an uphill argument: Congress had enjoyed full power 
to forbid Chambers’s conduct when it occurred, and as a matter of or-
dinary English, the language of the Twenty-First Amendment took no 
sides.  There was no evidence that Congress and the States had any 
particular intentions about abating prosecutions.  If anything, the pub-
lic meaning pointed the other way: as the government argued, most 
states had joined Congress in abrogating the common law rule.230 
Instead, the Court addressed head-on the government’s argument 
“that the rule which is invoked is a common law rule and is opposed to 
present public policy.”231  As the Court saw it, an issue of constitution-
al power to punish was not an issue “of public policy which the courts 
may be considered free to declare.”232  Nor was it one on which the 
common law had “develop[ed]” over time; “the reason for the rule [had] 
not ceased,” and the underlying principle of limiting punishments was 
“not archaic but rather is continuing and vital.”233  Though most states 
had abolished the rule by statute, those statutes didn’t reflect an evolu-
tion in the common law over time, but “themselves recognize[d] the 
principle which would obtain in their absence.”234  In other words,  
the Court in Chambers was indeed enforcing a common law rule, one 
that the Constitution nonetheless made immune from certain kinds of 
statutory abrogation. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 228 Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 4, 16 Stat. 431, 432 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 109 
(2012)) (“[T]he repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, 
forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing act shall so expressly  
provide . . . .”). 
 229 Chambers, 291 U.S. at 224. 
 230 Id. at 226. 
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Our view is that the Court in Chambers generally got it right, and 
for the right reasons.  Whether or not the Twenty-First Amendment 
automatically abated prosecutions was something to be answered on 
its ratification, not something that Congress could decide later.  Maybe 
Congress can set new defaults for interpreting new amendments, if 
that’s necessary and proper to carry into execution some other power 
(say, the power to propose amendments).  But the general savings stat-
ute hadn’t done so, leaving the common law abatement rule in effect. 
While the example of common law abatement may seem picayune, 
there are lots of other places where constitutional interpretation relies 
on law to fill the gaps.  Just for starters, think of the presumption  
of constitutionality (or your preferred burden of proof for constitu- 
tional questions);235 the authority of constitutional precedents; the 
unenumerated power of congressional contempt; or the rules against 
legislative entrenchment.236  Applying our law of interpretation to the 
Constitution can be both trickier and more consequential than usual, 
due to Congress’s limited power to fix errors or to lay down new 
rules.237  But that simply pushes unwritten law to the fore. 
What’s more, just as for statutes, we look to unwritten law to iden-
tify the Constitution’s legal force and the object of constitutional in-
terpretation.  As we’ve both argued elsewhere, just as the constitution-
al document can’t tell us whether it’s really our law or merely a 
pretender like the Articles of Confederation, it also can’t settle how  
its own text should be understood238 — or whether its drafting materi-
als count as part of the material to be interpreted,239 or whether it of-
fers rules or guidelines,240 and so on.  The Constitution’s legal status 
and legal content may both be settled instead by unwritten law.  
IV.  IMPLICATIONS 
We’ve argued that legal systems can and should have a law of in-
terpretation, and that our system does indeed have one.  Now we turn 
to the question of implications.  Recognizing our law of interpretation 
can resolve two important confusions in public law: the existence and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 235 See generally Christopher R. Green, Constitutional Theory and the Activismometer: How to 
Think About Indeterminacy, Restraint, Vagueness, Executive Review, and Precedent, 54 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 403 (2014); Lawson, Proving the Law, supra note 179. 
 236 See generally Stephen E. Sachs, The “Unwritten Constitution” and Unwritten Law, 2013 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1797. 
 237 Cf. Richard Primus, The Cost of the Text, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manu-
script at 11–12), http://ssrn.com/id=2812872 [https://perma.cc/A3NR-VEPP]. 
 238 Baude, supra note 53, at 2363–65; Sachs, supra note 53, at 829–32. 
 239 See supra p. 1112. 
 240 See supra pp. 1114–15. 
  
2017] THE LAW OF INTERPRETATION 1121 
authority of the canons and the use of construction as a supplement to 
interpretation. 
A.  Assessing the Canons 
Once we see that interpretation is governed by legal rules, we can 
think more clearly about what kind of rules these are.  As mentioned 
above, there are a great many canons, and indeed no single authorita-
tive list of them all.241 
At the same time, scholarly attempts to enumerate the canons have 
created endless disagreement and confusion.242  What authority do 
these canons have, if any?  How would one know whether a proposed 
canon is real or false?  The competing accounts seem to make these 
questions harder, and also raise the possibility that they’re ultimately 
indeterminate.  Our framework lets us see the logic of the canons and 
helps point the way to some answers. 
1.  Their Authority. — Consider authority first.  As one might ex-
pect by this point, we distinguish linguistic rules, which are features of 
how some group of actual people actually speak, from the legal rules 
that regulate how a given legal system handles texts.  This roughly 
tracks two existing categories in statutory interpretation: “linguistic” 
(or “textual”) canons, which seek “to decipher the legislature’s intent,” 
and “substantive” canons that “promote policies external to a  
statute.”243  
This division immediately raises a question of authority.  Linguistic 
canons piggyback on the authority of whoever adopted the instrument 
in the first place.  These canons are just attempts to read whatever the 
authors wrote, according to the appropriate theory of reading — au-
thorial intention, public meaning, and so on.  By definition, nonlinguis-
tic canons attempt to do something else.  So why should we apply 
them? 
To some scholars, the answer is that “we shouldn’t.”  Professor 
Amy Barrett, for example, notes that seemingly substantive canons 
like the rule of lenity or Charming Betsy have been with us since 
preconstitutional or early American practice.244  So while these canons 
are hard to square with a simple faithful-agency account, it seems like-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 241 See supra p. 1088. 
 242 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 531 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 31, and criticizing Scalia 
and Garner’s turn to the canons); Andrew Koppelman, Passive Aggressive: Scalia and Garner on 
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 243 Barrett, supra note 91, at 117 & n.27; see also Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 39, at 
924; id. at 924–25 (identifying a third category of “extrinsic” canons, which refer to extratextual 
materials such as legislative history). 
 244 Barrett, supra note 91, at 125–54. 
  
1122 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 130:1079 
ly that they’re at least consistent with Article III’s judicial power.245  
But Barrett argues that such canons have no more legal authority to 
affect interpretation than would “a more general concern for equi-
ty”;246 those who give only modest scope to the latter must do the same 
for the former.  Perhaps some rules can be derived from the Constitu-
tion itself,247 but most can’t be — leading Barrett to doubt the validity 
even of common law defenses to criminal statutes.248  Others, like Pro-
fessor William Eskridge, take the persistence of these canons to “ne-
gate the claims of both textualist and purposivist judges that they are 
nothing more than the faithful agents of legislatures or umpires calling 
balls and strikes.”249 
Our view resolves this puzzle in a different way.  Legal canons 
don’t need to be recast as a form of quasi-constitutional doctrine, be-
cause they don’t need to outrank the statutes to which they apply.  In-
stead, the canons stand on their own authority as a form of common 
law.  This authority distinguishes them from “a more general concern 
for equity”250 — unless, of course, a general concern for equity turns 
out to be an established rule of unwritten law.251 
2.  Their Validity. — The division between language and law also 
tells us how to assess each purported canon as valid or not.  Much re-
cent research focuses on “how Congress actually functions,”252 explor-
ing its internal dynamics and approaches to drafting.253  But as Gluck 
and Bressman helpfully acknowledge, the implications of this research 
for any given canon depend on that canon’s role.254  Some canons 
might be effective guides to legislative intent,255 while others might 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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not;256 they portray the latter as potentially advancing “‘rule of law’ 
norms,” making the legal system work better.257  We propose a slightly 
different dichotomy: canons of language and canons of law. 
Because language depends on practice, a linguistic rule stands or 
falls by its use.  Noah Webster’s 1828 dictionary is a poor tool for un-
derstanding the last omnibus spending bill if it doesn’t describe how 
people in and around Congress now speak.  Similarly, a linguistic can-
on founded on the way people used to speak in 1828 might be a poor 
tool for understanding what Congress produces today.  As heuristics 
about actual linguistic practices, these canons should be directly falsi-
fiable by empirical studies of the relevant community.258 
By contrast, legal canons operate even if — indeed, especially if — 
the drafters are unaware of them.  At least on our view of jurispru-
dence,259 law also depends on practice, but not in quite the same way 
that language does.  Unlike the primary rules of a language, most legal 
rules derive their validity from other, higher-order rules and practic-
es — and they remain valid even after they’ve fallen out of common 
use, so long as those higher-order rules have not.260  If nearly everyone 
forgot about the semicolon, it’d quickly disappear from standard En-
glish; but we can all forget some details of the U.S. Code (say, that it’s 
illegal to have switchblades on guano islands), so long as we remember 
how to look them up later.261  Many legal canons are common law de-
fault rules, so they keep chugging along until they’re affirmatively dis-
placed.  If anything, the lack of knowledge about a canon reinforces 
the strength of that canon: what legislators were unaware of, they’re 
unlikely to have displaced. 
To be sure, legal canons can eventually be falsified by practice, too.  
Unwritten law can usually be displaced by statute (unless it’s somehow 
been constitutionally protected from abrogation).262  Or it might evolve 
on its own terms, depending on one’s theory of the common law.  And 
unwritten rules, like all legal rules, could all be thrown over if we 
move to a different legal regime.  But unless those things happen, un-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 256 Id. at 907; id. at 949 (describing “disconnected” and “rejected” canons). 
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written legal rules remain in force even when we lack complete agree-
ment about them. 
We think these presumptions are implicit in our shared understand-
ing of language and law, but the discussion is also confounded by loose 
talk.  For instance, one often hears that Congress is “presumed” to 
write statutes “in light of [a] background principle” like equitable toll-
ing.263  That’s fine, but it seems to invite the possibility that the pre-
sumption could be rebutted if a sufficient number of legislators were 
unaware of the principle.  As Manning has aptly observed, though, 
this kind of presumption operates “[w]hether or not an actual legislator 
is subjectively aware of the law’s background principles”; it’s better 
seen as an “assumption that a ‘reasonable legislator’” — that is, a con-
structed one, not a real one — “knows or should know the social and 
linguistic practices of the . . . legal community.”264 
We think it’s more helpful to recognize that different canons are the 
products of different practices in different communities.  Linguistic 
canons are designed to handle communications, so their validity turns 
directly on the linguistic practices of those who write and read legisla-
tion.  But individual legal rules are derived from broader legal conven-
tions, so their validity turns on the recognized legal practices of those 
who constitute the legal system (perhaps including judges, officials, 
lawyers, or the legally educated public),265 and on inferences from  
these practices that the participants themselves might not have drawn.  
We can say that an enacting Congress “understood” or “knew” or “ac-
cepted” all these rules, but that’s true only of Congress-the-legal-entity, 
the artificial construct of our legal rules.  The natural persons we call 
“members of Congress” didn’t have to know these rules at all, and it 
seriously confuses matters to pretend that they did. 
This distinction also provides a first cut at how to understand the 
implications of the empirical studies.  Gluck and Bressman discovered 
that many established canons of interpretation either are unknown to 
congressional staffers or don’t reflect the staffers’ claims about the 
drafting process.266  The authors correctly note that these facts, if true, 
could potentially undermine claims that methods of statutory interpre-
tation can be wholly traced back to the legislative authority.267 
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We would add that the distinction between linguistic and legal 
canons tells us what should come next.  Because linguistic canons live 
or die by their usage, Gluck and Bressman’s empirical claims might be 
highly relevant to them.268  By contrast, congressional ignorance of le-
gal canons is largely unmomentous.269  As we’ve said, legal canons op-
erate on a different track, so our representatives’ lack of knowledge 
about them is as irrelevant as their ignorance of accomplice liability or 
general federal question jurisdiction. 
3.  Some Examples. — The law of interpretation lets us take stock 
of proposed canons by seeing whether they satisfy either of the two 
paths to validity: linguistic or legal.  To satisfy the linguistic path is to 
show that the canon accurately gauges how lawmakers and law-
readers communicate.270  To satisfy the legal path is to show that the 
canon meets the general standards for the validity of legal rules, as 
supplied by the appropriate theory of jurisprudence.  (In our view, this 
involves being the product of secondary rules yielded by our rule of 
recognition; applications of your own preferred theory are left as an 
exercise for the reader.)  Often a canon is plausible only on one path or 
the other; but either is sufficient to validate its use. 
An example might help.  Scalia and Garner list among their fifty-
seven canons the “Series-Qualifier”: “When there is a straightforward, 
parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a 
prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire se-
ries.”271  The canon’s application to a 1998 child pornography law was 
extensively discussed in Lockhart v. United States, recently decided by 
the Supreme Court.272  But, as one observer noted, nobody proposed 
this maxim as a canon until Justice Scalia “pioneered” it in his book a 
few years ago.273  What sense does it make for a Justice to propose a 
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communication.  See supra section III.B.3.a, pp. 1112–14. 
 271 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 31, at 147. 
 272 136 S. Ct. 958, 965–66 (2016); id. at 969–73 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 967–68 
(majority opinion) (describing the history of the provision at issue). 
 273 Asher Steinberg, The Government Jumps off a Cliff in Lockhart v. U.S., and Why All 
Textualism Is (Constructive) Intentionalism, NARROWEST GROUNDS (Oct. 22, 2015, 5:21 PM),  
h t t p : / / n a r r o w e s t g r o u n d s . b l o g s p o t . c o m / 2 0 1 5 / 1 0 / t h e - g o v e r n m e n t - j u m p s - o f f - c l i f f - i n . h t m l 
[https://perma.cc/2VM4-NRFD]. 
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previously nonexistent canon in a book in 2012, and then for the Court 
to discuss it in 2016, in the course of interpreting a statute from 1998?  
The key to making sense of this new canon is to understand its sta-
tus.  The series-qualifier canon purports to be “a matter of common 
English” that’s “highly sensitive to context”274 — hence, a linguistic 
rule.  That means it stands or falls on its use.  If it accurately describes 
how certain people speak, then it’s a valid canon of usage.275  The fact 
that it hadn’t been previously known by that name is no more defeat-
ing than the fact that a usage dictionary has a new entry in it. 
Similarly, even if a linguistic canon is oft-recognized, that doesn’t 
make it right.  Just as formal recognition isn’t necessary for a linguistic 
canon to be valid, it isn’t sufficient either.  What matters is usage.  
Consider the more famous canon against superfluity or surplusage, 
which also purports to be linguistic.276  It might well turn out that 
“some overlap is common in laws of [a certain] kind,” and that “law-
makers, like Shakespeare characters, sometimes employ overlap or re-
dundancy so as to remove any doubt and make doubly sure.”277  
Lawmakers might use repetitive “doublet” phrases such as “metes and 
bounds” or “cease and desist” — another “form of redundancy in 
which lawyers delight.”278  And readers of statutes may well expect 
and comprehend such redundancy.  If redundancy were actually far 
more common than we realized among the relevant readers and speak-
ers, then the canon against superfluity might need to be modified or 
abandoned. 
It’s no answer to say, as some defenders of the surplusage canon do, 
that “[s]tatutes should be carefully drafted, and encouraging courts to 
ignore sloppily inserted words results in legislative free-riding” — or 
that legislators “ought to hire eagle-eyed editors” to conform draft bills 
to the canon.279  The linguistic canons were made for man, not man 
for the linguistic canons.  Absent binding law to apply, declaring that 
Congress “should” adhere to some particular rule of usage (such as 
avoiding surplusage, or spelling “colour” with a “u”) would be like de-
claring that Congress “should” write all distances in furlongs and all 
numbers in binary — and should hire extra staffers to make it so. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 274 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 31, at 147, 150. 
 275 See Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. at 970 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“That interpretive practice of apply-
ing the modifier to the whole list boasts a fancy name[,] . . .  but, as my opening examples show, it 
reflects the completely ordinary way that people speak and listen, write and read.”). 
 276 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 31, at 174–79. 
 277 Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh, J.) (citing Gluck & 
Bressman, Part I, supra note 39, at 934–35). 
 278 In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 646 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(Posner, J.) (quoting BRYAN A. GARNER, THE REDBOOK: A MANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE 
§ 11.2(f) (2d ed. 2006)). 
 279 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 31, at 179. 
  
2017] THE LAW OF INTERPRETATION 1127 
So that’s linguistic canons.  When we turn to canons that seem im-
plausible as accounts of linguistic practice, it’s a different story.  The 
rule of lenity, for instance, isn’t an empirical claim that a particular 
Congress meant to express solicitude for criminal defendants.  (If it 
were, no one would believe it.)  Nor are these canons founded on an 
ability to make the legal system work better; just like any other legal 
rules, canons might sometimes make the legal system worse.280  In-
stead, these canons have to be tested according to the appropriate the-
ory of determining unwritten law.  We, following our previously ex-
pressed views on positive features of the American legal system, would 
ask whether the canons were rules of law at the Founding or have val-
idly become law since, pursuant to rules of legal change that were 
themselves valid in this way.281  But other people might propose other 
tests instead. 
The rule of lenity probably passes our test, as it appears to date 
back to the Founding.282  But other legal canons might not.  It’s far 
from clear, as a matter of language, that an ambiguous grant of regula-
tory authority really means a Chevron-style delegation to the agency to 
fill any relevant gaps (to be exercised subject to procedural safeguards, 
such as notice-and-comment rulemaking, and so on).283  It’s more 
plausible to see Chevron as a certain kind of closure rule: if the agency 
was generally granted power to regulate a field through certain means, 
then it’s the challenger’s burden to show that some particular subfield 
was excluded from this grant, and this burden can be met only with 
clear text.  But there are other possible closure rules in which the tie 
might go to the challenger — for instance, that “agencies have no pow-
er beyond that granted by Congress,” or simply that “everything not 
forbidden is permitted.”  The correctness of Chevron might come down 
to which of these closure rules, if any, meets our criteria for law.284 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 280 See Kavanaugh, supra note 199, at 2154–56 (calling for the revision of various traditional 
canons that involve difficult judgments of ambiguity). 
 281 Baude, supra note 53, at 2355 n.16; Sachs, supra note 53, at 819. 
 282 Barrett, supra note 91, at 129 (“Schooled in the English tradition, American judges applied 
the principle of lenity from the start.”); see also John F. Stinneford, Dividing Crime, Multiplying 
Punishments, 48 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1955, 1994–2001 (2015) (arguing that “the rule of strict con-
struction of penal statutes,” id. at 1995, stood in place of the modern rule of lenity from the 
Founding until the 1950s); cf. SCALIA, supra note 52, at 29 (“The rule of lenity is almost as old as 
the common law itself, so I suppose that is validated by sheer antiquity.  The others I am more 
doubtful about.” (footnote omitted)). 
 283 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 284 See generally Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 
126 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/id=2649445 [https://perma.cc/MPN8-9Z3K] 
(exploring and criticizing legal rationales for Chevron deference). 
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B.  Assessing Construction 
The law of interpretation can also shed some light on the relation-
ship between interpretation and construction.  As we understand it, 
“interpretation” here refers to a search for linguistic meanings, for in-
formation that a particular text might communicate.  “Construction,” 
by contrast, is a search for legal content, for legal propositions that a 
particular instrument establishes or makes true.  As we noted above, 
this distinction seems to us both real and useful.  But we also under-
stand why it’s generated substantial controversy, which we think the 
law of interpretation might help resolve. 
1.  Concerns About Construction. — The problem is this.  As Pro-
fessor Lawrence Solum argues, the meaning of “the constitutional text 
does not provide determinate answers to constitutional questions.”285  
When that happens, what’s left is a “construction zone[],” in which of-
ficials must act — by assumption — “on the basis of normative con-
siderations that are not fully determined by the communicative content 
of the constitutional text.”286 
But what these normative considerations are, and hence what’s 
supposed to happen in these construction zones, can seem awfully in-
determinate.  That’s perhaps why other scholars, especially contempo-
rary originalists, have objected to this portrayal.287  Some have 
searched far and wide for textual rules to settle these disputes.288  Oth-
ers have suggested that construction is a political act.289  Still others 
have denied the distinction entirely, as “born[] out of false linguistic as-
sociation” and having “done harm in the work of constitutional theo-
rists who wish to liberate judges from the texts they construe.”290 
One can’t blame folks for worrying that “construction zones” are 
catastrophic gaps in the law where anything might happen.  If con-
struction is the product of “normative considerations” (because the 
text, by assumption, is silent on these questions), there might be liber-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 285 Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
453, 458 (2013). 
 286 Solum, supra note 46, at 5; see also Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 70 (2011) (requiring “a theory of construction to employ when origi-
nal meaning runs out”); Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 119, 120–21 (2010) (“Construction picks up where interpretation leaves off.”  
Id. at 120.). 
 287 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New 
Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 783 (2009) 
(criticizing the concept of construction as indeterminate). 
 288 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225 (2012); Paulsen, su-
pra note 225. 
 289 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1–17 (1999). 
 290 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 31, at 14. 
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tarian constructions, Dworkinian constructions, Thayerian construc-
tions, and so on.291  Professor Jack Balkin, for example, would restrict 
interpretation only to “areas of likely and overwhelming agreement” on 
the original meaning.292  Whenever there’s any real dispute, our inter-
pretive shackles fall off, and we’re free to invoke “all available modali-
ties of argument”293 — including “precedent, inter-branch convention, 
structure, and consequences”294 — to serve “as sources of wisdom or 
insight” in the construction process.295  With friends like these, no 
wonder construction has enemies.  We don’t think most of construc-
tion’s proponents intend it to be a free-for-all.  But if it isn’t, we need 
something more to settle it. 
2.  Construction and Law. — As you might expect, we think there 
is “something more” — the law of interpretation.  Legal interpretive 
rules do represent a form of construction, as they determine legal effect 
rather than linguistic meaning.  But they’re the product of “normative 
considerations” only in a thin and limited sense.  The individual judges 
doing the constructing aren’t left wholly to their own normative views, 
but rather take their cues from an existing legal system, of which the 
interpretive rules form a part.  These rules themselves may not be 
“found in the semantic content of the written Constitution,” as Profes-
sor Randy Barnett notes.296  But as explained above, that needn’t be a 
problem, so long as they’re found in the law.  So while Barnett is right 
that interpreters “need a normative theory for how to construe a con-
stitution when its meaning runs out,”297 that’s true in the nonunique 
sense that the problem of political obligation is not yet solved, and that 
an individual moral actor always needs a normative theory to justify 
following (or violating, or ignoring) a legal rule.298 
Once again, our model matches interpretation in private law.  
Solum notes that decades of contracts scholars have distinguished be-
tween interpretation and construction.299  As Corbin put it, “interpre-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 291 See Solum, supra note 285, at 473. 
 292 Jack M. Balkin, The Construction of Original Public Meaning, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 71, 
80 (2016) (emphasis added). 
 293 Id. at 92. 
 294 Id. at 74. 
 295 Id. at 92. 
 296 Barnett, supra note 286, at 69. 
 297 Id. at 70. 
 298 See Baude, supra note 53, at 2392, 2394–95; see also H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Sepa-
ration of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958). 
 299 See Solum, supra note 46, at 10.  Solum also traces the concept as far back as Franz 
Lieber’s work in 1839.  Id.  But cf. Richard S. Kay, Construction, Originalist Interpretation and 
the Complete Constitution, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3–6), 
http://ssrn.com/id=2778744 [https://perma.cc/T3FB-DXW7] (questioning either the clarity or the 
relevance of Lieber’s work). 
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tation” pertains “with respect to language itself,”300 while construction 
“determine[s] its legal effect” — meaning that construction decides 
both “whose meaning and understanding” controls,301 and also which 
rules are used to “fill[] in gaps in the terms of an agreement.”302 
In contract law, we also take it to be relatively uncontroversial that 
construction is largely a matter of law.  In Corbin’s words, the question 
of whose interpretation controls is “determined . . . as required by 
some substantive rule of law.”303  Similarly, he describes nonlinguistic 
rules of construction as rules of law, “legal requirement[s]” imposed by 
“a statute or other legal rule.”304 
We submit that the same holds for construction in public law.305  
The functions of construction are very close to what we’ve described 
as functions of the law of interpretation: to identify which features, of 
which communications, will carry legal effect, and to identify legal 
rules that supplement and refine the raw language.  So at a first ap-
proximation, we’d say that the appropriate theory of construction is 
simply to apply the law of interpretation.  Indeed, it’s been suggest-
ed — with some justice — that the legal rules we describe might just 
as well be called “the law of construction.”306 
3.  Resolving the Disputes. — This analogy to private law puts us 
in broad agreement with some of those who endorse construction.  As 
Solum notes, the private-law distinctions largely mirror the ones that 
he emphasizes today for public law.307  Public-law construction both 
determines “the legal effect of the constitutional text” and “determines 
the content of constitutional doctrine.”308  We think Solum is right that 
something other than language is doing an awful lot of the work in 
generating legal content.  What we would emphasize is that this pro-
cess can be and usually is controlled by law.  While in principle there 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 300 3 CORBIN, supra note 10, § 534, at 8. 
 301 Id. § 535, at 22. 
 302 Id. § 534, at 11.  Professor Greg Klass argues that other scholars (such as Williston) defined 
construction slightly differently, but that Corbin was right.  Greg Klass, Interpretation and Con-
struction 3: Arthur Linton Corbin, NEW PRIVATE LAW (Nov. 25, 2015), h t t p : / / b l o g s . l a w . h a r v a r d 
. e d u / n p l b l o g / 2 0 1 5 / 1 1 / 2 5 / i n t e r p r e t a t i o n - a n d - c o n s t r u c t i o n - 3 - a r t h u r - l i n t o n - c o r b i n - g r e g - k l a s s  [ h t t p s : / / 
perma.cc/P3SE-A9P3]. 
 303 3 CORBIN, supra note 10, § 532, at 4; see also id. at 5 (“[T]he court must determine, in ac-
cordance with the applicable law, whose meaning is to prevail.”); id. § 535, at 22. 
 304 Id. § 550, at 196–97; see also id. § 551, at 200–01 (discussing statutory requirements); 4 
WALTER H.E. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 602, at 320 (3d ed. 1961) (“Construc-
tion . . . is rightly used wherever the import of the writing is made to depend upon a special sense 
imposed by law.” (emphasis added)). 
 305 But see Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism from 
Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 553 (2013) (debating whether “construc-
tion” is part of “a theory of law” or instead “a theory of adjudication”). 
 306 We are indebted for this point to Lawrence Solum. 
 307 Solum, supra note 285, at 468. 
 308 Id. at 457. 
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could be constructions following any of dozens of normative paths, in 
practice the law will often have picked one.309 
Thus we also find ourselves in agreement with much of what’s 
written by two of construction’s biggest critics.  Professors John 
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport say that “original meaning need not 
run out when constitutional language is ambiguous or vague, as con-
structionists often assert,” because one can often use “the original in-
terpretive rules”310 or “original legal methods”311 to resolve the inde-
terminacy.  We basically agree, but we would reframe some of that 
resolution as the law of interpretation.  The “original legal methods” 
are, in our view, the law of interpretation as it stood at the Founding.  
When there’s a question about the law that the Constitution made, the 
right place to turn isn’t to just any construction, but to the particular 
construction prescribed by law.  Call it original methods, call it a form 
of construction; our point is that linguistic content must be processed 
through law. 
The fit between construction and legal interpretive rules may not 
be perfect.  For example, Solum sees construction as particularly nec-
essary when the text is “vague or irreducibly ambiguous.”312  But those 
cases may be beyond the power of interpretive rules to cure.  If the 
proposition of law established by the text, after we’ve brought all our 
linguistic and legal tools to bear, is that an award of attorney fees must 
be reasonable,313 or that a case may be transferred to another venue in 
the interest of justice,314 the law of interpretation won’t tell us what 
reason and justice require.315  (Some scholars have used “construction” 
to encompass the creation of judicial doctrine in such cases, such as 
the tiers of scrutiny or the n-part test for obscenity.316  We doubt that 
the law of interpretation reaches that far — creating doctrine often 
seems to be a task that comes after the law is already in place — 
though we see some ambiguity on the point.317) 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 309 We are not certain whether Solum excludes from construction the question of whose or 
which linguistic meaning counts.  As explained supra sections I.B.2, pp. 1089–92, & III.B.3, pp. 
1112–14, we follow Corbin in thinking that this is a question for law to answer. 
 310 JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CON-
STITUTION 140 (2013). 
 311 Id. at 150. 
 312 Solum, supra note 285, at 458. 
 313 E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 314 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). 
 315 Accord Timothy Endicott, Legal Interpretation, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 109, 109 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012). 
 316 Kermit Roosevelt III, Interpretation and Construction: Originalism and Its Discontents, 34 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 103–08 (2011); Solum, supra note 285, at 468–69. 
 317 For instance, some doctrinal rules, such as rules of judicial deference, Roosevelt, supra note 
316, at 106–08, might derive directly from interpretive rules governing conduct under uncertainty.  
See infra p. 1133.  For more on the generation of doctrine, whatever one calls it, see Mitchell N. 
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Ultimately, though, our goal isn’t to quibble about the exact do-
mains of construction and interpretation, or for that matter about the 
terminology of construction itself.318  Our basic point is that attention 
to and development of our law of interpretation ought to make debates 
about construction significantly less open-ended — and significantly 
more, shall we say, constructive. 
V.  OBJECTIONS 
A.  Mutability 
To some, our approach might seem at odds with the very notion of 
written law.  Indeed, it might invite legal chaos.  If every legal text 
were constantly being run through unwritten rules of interpretation, 
couldn’t those rules change wildly over time?  Couldn’t that lead to 
mindless legal systems evolving in ways no one wanted?  Or to judges 
seizing the power to rewrite the interpretive rules, and so to rewrite 
our Constitution and legal code? 
We’re sensitive to these concerns, but we think them ill-founded.  
Properly understood, the law of interpretation won’t have this effect, 
and indeed will clear up a lot of confusion about legal change over 
time — at least on our own views about law.  Up until now we’ve 
been writing from a relatively catholic perspective, assuming that we 
should look to what law says about interpretation without adjudicat-
ing some of the more disputed questions about what law is and how it 
changes.  If we make some (we think) modest additional claims or as-
sumptions about law, we can also understand a lot about how law 
changes over time.  (If your own preferred view of law rejects these as-
sumptions, it might lead to a more amorphous, changeable law.  But 
that’s on you.) 
We first explain what happens when the rules of interpretation 
change; we then discuss who has power to change them. 
1.  What Happens When Interpretive Rules Change? 
(a)  Adoption Rules and Application Rules. — Our basic view is 
that legal instruments, from deeds to statutes to constitutions, do their 
legal work when adopted.  This follows from two claims. 
First, our legal rules persist over time, until something legally sig-
nificant happens to alter them.  The way to understand the content of 
a legal instrument, whether private or public, is to ask what the legal 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004); Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitu-
tional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2005). 
 318 Compare, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 31, at 14–15, with Solum, supra note 285, at 
484–85, 493–95. 
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system looked like beforehand, and then to see what the new instru-
ment did or didn’t change.319 
Second, when new instruments are adopted, they operate on the 
facts at particular points in time, as determined by “the relevant activi-
ty that the rule regulates.”320  The substance of the law typically 
changes prospectively, affecting relevant activities from and after the 
date of the change.321  For example, even without an effective date 
provision or an Ex Post Facto Clause, a new statute punishing the 
mailing of geese would usually apply only to geese mailed after  
the date of enactment.  A new rule raising the bar for qualifying expert 
witnesses would likewise apply only to experts qualified after the stat-
ute took effect, and so on.322 
Combining these two claims, we can hazard a guess about how to 
handle changes in the law of interpretation.  Many legal rules of inter-
pretation are what we call adoption rules: they determine the legal 
content of a written instrument upon its adoption.  As a result, the 
version of the rule relevant to a particular text is the one that governed 
at the time the text was adopted and made its impact on the law — 
when its legal content, to use Bentham’s phrase, was “poured into the 
sea.”323  For instance, if Congress simply abolished § 108 and returned 
to the common law repeal-revival rule, we wouldn’t expect a century’s 
worth of unrevived statutes suddenly to spring back to life; they didn’t 
get revived when they had the chance, and their old repealing statutes 
won’t do more work now. 
By contrast, application rules are framed as instructions to future 
decisionmakers, including judges, on what to do at the point of appli-
cation.324  For instance, modern courts might defer to the State De-
partment’s present views on treaty interpretation — not because the 
Department can rewrite treaties, but just because it knows more about 
foreign relations.325  And some of these rules might vary for different 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 319 Accord 4 JOHN FINNIS, Just Votes for Unjust Laws, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 
12, at 436, 443. 
 320 Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 697 n.17 (2004) (quoting Landgraf v. USI 
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 291 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgments)). 
 321 See id. (“Absent clear statement otherwise, only such relevant activity which occurs after 
the effective date of the statute is covered.”). 
 322 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 291 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgments). 
 323 BENTHAM, supra note 94, at 236. 
 324 This distinction resembles Professor Mitchell Berman’s distinction between “constitutional 
operative propositions” (“doctrines that represent the judiciary’s understanding of the proper 
meaning of a constitutional . . . provision”) and “constitutional decision rules” (“doctrines that di-
rect courts how to decide whether a constitutional operative proposition is satisfied”).  Berman, 
supra note 317, at 9. 
 325 See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 & 184 n.10 (1982); see also 
David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A Historical Perspec-
tive, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497 (2007). 
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interpreters: the Patent and Trademark Office reads patent claims 
more broadly in reexamination proceedings than courts do in in-
fringement suits, to let applicants “adjust the scope of claim protection 
as needed” and to avoid giving “finally allowed” claims “broader scope 
than is justified.”326  Because rules like these regulate present deci-
sions, and not the instrument’s original content, they take effect at the 
time of decision.  So unless some other rule prevents it, a change to an 
application rule can have full effect in all future cases to which the 
rule applies, even if they involve texts that were adopted long ago. 
As with the canons, to figure out when a rule works we have to 
figure out what kind of rule it is.  Suppose, for example, that Congress 
repealed Chevron and replaced it with a Diceyan presumption against 
the legality of agency action.  What would happen to uncertain provi-
sions in existing statutes?  If Chevron is a rule about delegated pow-
ers,327 then it’s probably an adoption rule: the agency got a bundle of 
powers upon enactment and will keep them until they’re affirmatively 
taken away.  If, though, Chevron is a rule of judicial deference,328 then 
it’s probably an application rule: it tells courts not to set aside agency 
action too quickly, and so it applies to tomorrow’s cases under yester-
day’s statutes. 
(b)  Implications for Interpretation. — These rules for changing 
law also determine the effect of changing language.  One can read the 
language of a legal text according to any number of linguistic conven-
tions: those of the authors, the readers, the lawyer class, the lay public, 
and so on.  What matters for determining legal content is the particu-
lar type of meaning that the law of interpretation chooses.  And what-
ever linguistic answer the legal system chooses, it makes this choice as 
of the date of adoption: that’s when the text makes its impact on the 
law, pouring its contribution into the sea.  If all this is right, then 
we’ve got another reason to look to original linguistic conventions 
when construing an old text: the law of interpretation, at the time, 
likely cross-referenced the linguistic practices of the time, and not any 
unknown practices to be developed in the future.  (A society could re-
quire phrases like “domestic Violence”329 to be read according to their 
evolving meanings over time; for obvious reasons, very few do.330) 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 326 In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984); accord Cuozzo Speed Techs., 
LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) (applying this standard to inter partes review). 
 327 See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 597 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting that Chevron deference turns on whether “Congress actually intended to delegate interpre-
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 328 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 242–43 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
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 329 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 330 This accords with Solum’s “Fixation Thesis,” that “[t]he meaning of the constitutional text is 
fixed when each provision is framed and ratified.”  Solum, supra note 46, at 1.  But we take this 
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This way of looking at interpretation is particularly compatible 
with certain forms of originalism.  As we’ve argued above, the law of 
interpretation applies to the Constitution no less than to a statute or 
contract.  A constitutional provision generally has whatever legal con-
tent it was assigned when it was ratified — meaning the content de-
termined by the original adoption rules, including their potential in-
corporation of then-current linguistic practice.331 
This approach also explains how to think about original interpre-
tive conventions, such as James Madison’s vision that constitutional 
indeterminacies would be “liquidated” through practice.332  The first 
question is whether liquidation was understood as a rule of law, or as a 
mere custom or prediction about what future judges might do.  If it 
was law, the next question is whether it was an adoption rule, incorpo-
rating in the Constitution’s legal content an implicit delegation to fu-
ture generations to iron out ambiguities.  If so, it would ordinarily be 
preserved over time.  By contrast, if liquidation is instead best under-
stood as an application rule — an instruction to resolve future un-
certainties with an eye to settled practice, perhaps analogous to prece-
dent333 — then there’s a further question: whether this original law of 
liquidation has been amended or altered in the intervening years. 
Our views thus resemble and overlap with the “original methods” 
proposal put forth by McGinnis and Rappaport, with one crucial elab-
oration.  McGinnis and Rappaport, focusing on the text of the Consti-
tution, argue that its interpretation should be “based on the content of 
the interpretive rules in place when the Constitution was enacted.”334  
We mostly agree, but we would distinguish sharply between linguistic 
and legal rules.  McGinnis and Rappaport, by contrast, do not think 
that distinction important.  They describe their “single core idea” as 
being “that the meaning of language requires reference to the [original] 
interpretive rules and methods.”335  They understand that idea to in-
clude, without distinction, not only linguistic interpretive rules but also 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
thesis to be a contingent matter, and not a necessary truth about any legal system that uses texts 
(or about the nature of texts themselves). 
 331 As a reminder, we don’t claim to have proved that this way of looking at interpretation is 
either conceptually required or normatively superior to its alternatives.  We have, though, each 
suggested that it’s required by our current positive law.  See generally Baude, supra note 53; 
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 333 See Baude, supra note 332, at 25–31. 
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what we see as nonlinguistic legal ones.336  For them the key distinc-
tion is between interpretive rules and other rules, regardless of source. 
Similarly, our views largely overlap with Nelson’s discussion of 
original interpretive conventions.  We share his view that the enforce-
able legal content of the Constitution “emerges from the application to 
the Constitution’s words of various legal and linguistic principles that 
reasonable members of the founding generation would have used to 
understand those words . . . even though the Constitution does not it-
self codify them.”337  We’d add only that, while Nelson’s discussion to 
some extent leaves open “[e]xactly which aspects of the founding gen-
eration’s ideas about interpretation retain their importance for present-
day interpreters,”338 we see that question as generally determined by 
Founding-era law. 
In our view, an interpretive rule’s force turns on whether or not it 
was good law, and if so, of what kind.  Adherence to the Constitution 
requires adherence to the original adoption rules (which happened to 
fix both the original linguistic rules and some of the nonlinguistic 
rules), as well as to original application rules that haven’t yet been al-
tered or amended.  But we’d leave out both interpretive customs that 
weren’t incorporated by law and any application rules that might have 
changed since adoption.  We’ve each advanced versions of originalism 
in which the law imposed by the document is consistent with  
Founding-era interpretive principles that might meet this test (such as 
liquidation).339  Our conclusions may or may not be right, but framing 
these issues in terms of the law of interpretation may make some dis-
agreements and fault lines clearer. 
2.  Who Can Change the Interpretive Rules? — Interpretive rules 
can change over time.  But how, and who can change them?  On our 
view, many interpretive rules — both in the states and in the federal 
system — take the form of unwritten law.  That view, however, raises 
two families of questions.  First, whose unwritten law is this?  Is it 
federal law, state law, or something else?  Is it proclaimed by judges, or 
is it the product of broader custom?  Second, who can override this 
law?  Can judges rewrite the rules that determine our reading of stat-
utes, or even of the Constitution?  Can Congress?  If it can’t, doesn’t 
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 336 See id. at 762 n.32; see also MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 310, at 142 (incorporat-
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large believe that what the law is — what our legal powers, duties, and rights are — is fully de-
termined by semantic qualities of promulgated texts.”  Mitchell N. Berman, Judge Posner’s Simple 
Law, 113 MICH. L. REV. 777, 779 (2015) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON 
JUDGING (2013)). 
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that make statutes subservient to common law?  And if it can, couldn’t 
Congress entrench its own statutes by “interpreting” away any future 
attempts to repeal them? 
(a)  The Nature of Interpretive Rules. — We see the unwritten law 
of interpretation as a form of “general law.”340  In this we differ from 
Gluck, who has written extensively on the legal status of interpretive 
rules, describing them as a form of “federal common law” and abjuring 
the “general law” label.341  We see two minor distinctions and one ma-
jor one. 
One minor issue is that the label of “federal common law” suggests 
that there’s something uniquely federal about the source of the unwrit-
ten law of interpretation.  When federal courts and state courts refer 
to, say, the rule of lenity, they’re referring to a common legal object 
that’s part of a common legal tradition (hence what Gluck calls the 
“universal, even ancient, feel” of the canons342), rather than fifty-one 
different defenses which happen to share the same name.  (Of course, 
these fifty-one jurisdictions don’t all have to treat lenity in the same 
way; even Swift v. Tyson recognized that general law could be supple-
mented by local usages that varied across jurisdictions.343) 
Another minor issue is that treating interpretive rules as general 
law allows for a broader range of possibilities regarding stare decisis.  
Gluck argues that federal courts don’t currently treat interpretive rules 
as law, in large part because they fail to give adequate stare decisis ef-
fect to past holdings on interpretation.344  But stare decisis and com-
mon law are separate categories.  One can have stare decisis for deci-
sions based on written law, and one can have common law without the 
modern version of stare decisis.  On one historically recognized view, 
the common law depends upon a “regular course of decisions.”345  In 
other words, a new rule might be slowly absorbed or rejected as gen-
eral law, rather than imposed through the fiat of a single majority. 
But finally and most importantly, “federal common law” suggests 
that the law of interpretation is up to federal courts and judges to re-
vise as they see fit.  Gluck adopts what we might call a very modern 
view of unwritten law — that it is “judge-made”346 or a “judicial crea-
tion[]”347 — and so she ultimately endorses a judicial “power to create 
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 340 See generally Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 503 
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 343 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842). 
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 347 Id. at 755 n.4. 
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and apply interpretive rules designed to shape and improve legisla-
tion.”348  We are not so sure that judges have the power to make inter-
pretive law in that sense.  In using the older label of “general law,” we 
mean to evoke Nelson’s observation that when judges “articulate and 
apply . . . legal doctrines that have not been codified,” they aren’t nec-
essarily “inventing rules of decision out of whole cloth.”349  Instead, 
they might be recognizing elements of an existing general-law tradi-
tion — a tradition that makes its appearance in judicial decisions, but 
isn’t merely their creature. 
(b)  Deliberate Change. 
(i)  By Judges. — Viewing interpretive rules as features of an exist-
ing legal tradition, as opposed to deliberate acts of lawmaking, helps 
answer many potential critiques of common law interpretation.  For 
instance, it wouldn’t matter that, as Alexander and Prakash write, “the 
federal judiciary has no authority to create binding rules of interpreta-
tion.”350  So long as judges are taking existing rules off the shelf, so to 
speak, no issue of creative authority arises.  This view also explains 
why we have a canon of narrowly reading statutes in derogation of the 
common law.  Rather than a “judicial power-grab”351 or a “fossil rem-
nant”352 of the medieval dark, it’s a simple corollary of the canon 
against implied repeal.  When a rule of law is already on the books (or, 
if you prefer, brooding omnipresently in the sky), we need some af-
firmative indication that a new rule has displaced it.353 
Of course, these rules must have originally come from somewhere.  
Barrett rejects the view that common law canons stand on their own 
bottom, because we can see back to (and before) the time of their crea-
tion.354  Without adjudicating the legality of each canon, we don’t 
think their nature as human artifacts is fatal.  The first court decision 
recognizing a given principle wasn’t necessarily making it up.  Courts 
might have a judicial obligation to find common law rules in other 
sources (including customary sources), not merely to make them to fit 
one’s will.355  As those sources evolve by slow accretion, or as under-
standings of the same materials change over time, eventually some 
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 354 See Barrett, supra note 91, at 111. 
 355 See Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law (Oct. 26, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
the Harvard Law School Library). 
  
2017] THE LAW OF INTERPRETATION 1139 
court will be the first to say so.356  But as Professor Brian Simpson 
points out, it’s simply a mistake to treat this first court decision as the 
actual source of the underlying rule.357  Even under quite formal- 
ist premises — and, indeed, even after Erie Railroad Co. v.  
Tompkins358 — judges may well have some authority to find common 
law rules.359 
(ii)  By Legislatures. — Assuming that judges can’t deliberately 
rewrite the law of interpretation, how about Congress?  Legislatures 
can trump common law when they choose.  If interpretation is gov-
erned by law, and not just language, could Congress redefine the Con-
stitution by changing the interpretive rules?  Or could it force us to 
read future statutes in a way that insulates its work from repeal — in-
validating, say, any statutes that fail to begin with “Mother May I” or 
“Simon Says”?360 
In most cases, no.  As described above, constitutional provisions 
took on their legal content at the time of ratification, under the inter-
pretive rules that governed at the time.  If Congress can’t change that 
content directly, it also can’t change it by retroactively altering the 
original adoption rules.361 
Nor can Congress force us to read future statutes in ways that limit 
a future Congress’s ability to legislate.  Unless it’s a “backdrop” consti-
tutionally insulated from change,362 a statutory rule of interpretation is 
at most a default rule that can be changed by Congress at any time.363  
A future Congress can also evade these rules by notoriously violating 
them, thereby working an implied repeal.  The rule against legislative 
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entrenchment — including its associated doctrine of implied repeal — 
may itself have been constitutionally insulated from change, as a 
common law limitation of the grant of powers to Congress.364  In that 
case, Congress can’t get rid of implied repeals, and it can’t prevent a 
future Congress from using them — even when what’s being repealed 
is a rule of interpretation. 
B.  Indeterminacy 
In addition to the theoretical problem of change over time, the law 
of interpretation also has to confront a practical problem of disagree-
ment.  People seem to disagree over what the law of interpretation ac-
tually is — and disagree again over how to apply it, once we find out. 
To be clear, we see this only as a practical problem, and not as a 
theoretical one.  On our view, the law doesn’t have to be any more de-
terminate than it is.  Law’s determinacy, like its content, depends on 
contingent social facts.  If a given legal system has more gray areas or 
includes more discretion for judges or other officials, then that’s just 
how this legal system works.365  All else being equal, indeterminacy 
might be something to avoid; but all else is rarely equal, and legal sys-
tems often privilege other goals.  The point of the law of interpretation 
isn’t to determine which interpretive approaches get the most determi-
nate results, but which approaches are most legally correct. 
As a practical problem for our current legal system, we think inde-
terminacy is serious, but not fatal.  We think there are good reasons to 
think that the law of interpretation can be found and applied much of 
the time.  And even if it can’t be found and applied in every single 
case, that doesn’t diminish its importance in the cases where it can be. 
1.  Finding the Law of Interpretation. — One good reason to have 
a law of interpretation is that people disagree on the correct interpre-
tive rules.  Yet this disagreement also makes it harder to see what the 
law is. 
This objection may be most acute when it comes to the Constitu-
tion, so that’s where we’ll focus.  On our view, to determine the Con-
stitution’s legal content, we need to know what the legal adoption 
rules were two hundred years ago.  But, as Cornell notes, people back 
then disagreed.366  Cornell describes a Founding-era “conflict between 
elite and popular approaches to constitutional interpretation,” in which 
“[p]roponents of a lawyer’s constitution clashed with champions of a 
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people’s constitution.”367  More specifically, Professor Kurt Lash cau-
tions against excessive reliance on the common law, as “the same gen-
eration that adopted the Constitution also challenged the uncritical ac-
ceptance of English common law.”368 
These historical critiques are important, but we think the focus on 
law may help us see past them.  Purely linguistic questions are ques-
tions of usage, determined by on-the-ground practice.  But the way to 
resolve a Founding-era legal disagreement isn’t merely to total up the 
votes and see who had more; we want to know who had the better of 
the argument, based on the higher-order legal rules of the era. 
And on that basis, Cornell’s and Lash’s historical evidence points 
in favor of something like the picture we’ve described.  Cornell de-
scribes the lawyerly class at the Founding as believing “that constitu-
tions ought to be interpreted according to the rules laid down by  
Anglo-American jurists such as Blackstone,”369 whose Commentaries 
were “a standard reference work for both the meaning of the common 
law and the methods of legal analysis.”370  That was precisely what the 
common folk allegedly disliked about legal interpretation: that it was 
full of fancy-sounding rules from England and so inaccessible to those 
without legal training.  Antifederalists like Brutus recognized — in or-
der to criticize on policy grounds — the prevailing Blackstonian con-
cept of legislative intent as “a complex legal construct . . . deduced 
from the application of a clear set of legal rules of construction.”371 
Similarly, Lash references as an example of the Founders’ divided 
opinion a post-Revolutionary popular movement against the common 
law.372  That movement was predicated on the idea that the English 
common law, full of “jargon-ridden formalisms . . . that only profes-
sional aristocrats could understand,” was already dominant in the legal 
profession — and indeed that “[t]he legal profession’s continuing exis-
tence in American society depended on the common law,” having es-
tablished “a monopoly on [that] law and the means of knowing it.”373 
Whether that elite tradition trumped any contrary popular objec-
tions isn’t just a historical question: it’s a legal one.  Different theories 
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of jurisprudence look to different facts to identify a society’s law.  If 
the practices of lawyers who participate in the legal system have a 
heightened claim to determining the law, at least as compared to the 
policy preferences of the general public, then it’s the elite practice that 
matters.  Indeed, Cornell’s evidence doesn’t suggest that popular-elite 
disagreement centered on the content of the law, so much as on the 
merits of the system that the lawyers had made for themselves.  If so, 
looking past the popular view wouldn’t be the “methodological obfus-
cation[]” that Cornell describes,374 but a jurisprudential obligation. 
We also note Lash’s argument that at the time of the Founding, 
“there were no preexisting methods of interpretation applicable to a 
‘federal’ Constitution,” as “no such constitution had ever existed.”375  
If true, this might make it impossible for originalists to rely on  
Founding-era unwritten law.  The status of the common law at the 
Founding is an enormous topic, and it can’t be done justice here,376 
but we are more optimistic than Lash.  While there was debate over 
which set of common law rules to use — in particular, whether the 
Constitution should be interpreted as a statute or as a treaty — Profes-
sor Jefferson Powell’s work suggests that the statutory model dominat-
ed for the first decade after ratification, and in any case that there was 
consensus on which legal consequences each of those interpretive mod-
els would have.377  The novelty of the Constitution made certain inter-
pretive moves more difficult, but it didn’t bar the use of an unwritten 
law of interpretation. 
2.  Applying the Law of Interpretation. — Once we know what our 
law of interpretation is, it still has to be applied.  We can know what 
laws we have without being certain of how much work they do.  In-
deed, some skeptics might claim that the law of interpretation is just 
as indeterminate as natural language, and therefore will have its own 
gaps to fill.  Consider Professor Karl Llewellyn’s famous article on du-
eling canons of interpretation, designed to portray the rules of interpre-
tation as hopelessly indeterminate.378  If that’s true, as Fallon argues, 
then looking to legal canons “only postpones the problem.”379 
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(a)  The Volume of Indeterminacy. — If you look at hard cases of 
statutory interpretation, it might seem like disagreement about the law 
of interpretation is rampant and deep.  Fallon observes that in hard 
cases, “theories such as textualism and purposivism, originalism and 
living constitutionalism”380 are “almost stunningly inadequate to per-
form the most basic function that one might expect them to 
fill”381 — namely supplying a “consistently and uniquely correct” 
choice among interpretive approaches “without an additional exercise 
of explicitly normative judgment.”382 
But there’s another way of looking at it.  After all, the disputed 
cases are disputed only because the applicable standards are un-
clear — at which point the relative indeterminacy that Fallon empha-
sizes may be tautological.  If, as Professor Frederick Schauer puts it, 
“we focus only . . . on the cases that a screening process selects [for] 
their very closeness,” we’ll never see any standard factor — law, lan-
guage, whatever — making a substantial difference.383  If it did, the 
cases would no longer be close. 
Fallon recognizes that “we ordinarily grasp . . . the meaning of 
statutory and constitutional provisions without needing to employ such 
theories at all.”384  But rather than make an argument against theory, 
we think the easy cases actually do the opposite.  Often these cases 
seem easy because a particular theory has become second nature to us, 
so that we no longer see it as a “theory” at all.  It’s an easy case, and 
not a hard one, that a new criminal statute takes the laws of duress or 
accessory liability as it finds them.  It’s easy to say that courts aren’t 
literalists that blindly follow dictionaries, that they don’t plumb the 
private diaries of senators to discover their actual intent, and so on.  
The question is why those cases are so easy — a question we think our 
theory helps resolve.385 
Understanding the canons as law also helps us to see how seeming-
ly contradictory canons can fit together.  When the canons are under-
stood as maxims, proverbs, or pieces of advice,386 it’s easy to see them 
as vaguely conflicting,387 like the sayings that “haste makes waste” and 
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that “he who hesitates is lost.”  But how different legal rules interact 
with one another is itself a question to be settled by law.  When courts 
encounter two potentially conflicting federal statutes, they don’t sim-
ply throw up their hands and say, “Dueling statutes!”  So too it should 
be with conflicting canons. 
(b)  Resolving Hard Cases. — Of course we do agree that hard cas-
es exist.  Statutory interpretation, under our theory or any other, won’t 
eliminate all “need for choice.”388  Some instruments are intentionally 
vague: say, a statute forbidding “neglect” of a child.389  But others that 
seem crystal clear will still have blurry edges.390  Hart invoked his cel-
ebrated example about “vehicles” in the park391 to show that a rule 
could be straightforward as to many applications (and nonapplications, 
such as pedestrians and flowerbeds),392 even as it contains a menagerie 
of edge cases (bicycles, motorized wheelchairs, a working truck incor-
porated in a war memorial, and so on).393 
These hard cases don’t arise in a vacuum.  Sensitive and accurate 
interpretation of legal language often takes place in a normatively 
charged context, and different interpreters may well reach different 
conclusions based on their different views of the world.  To apply the 
presumption that Congress doesn’t “hide elephants in mouseholes,”394 
you need to know what’s an elephant and what’s a mousehole.  So in-
terpreters routinely rely, as they must, on broader presuppositions 
about how the world works. 
To paraphrase an example from Professor Terry Winograd, consid-
er the following two statements: 
(1) The committee denied the group a parade permit because they advo-
cated violence. 
(2) The committee denied the group a parade permit because they feared 
violence.395 
From a linguistic perspective, these sentences are obviously ambig-
uous: “they” could just as easily refer to “the committee” as to “the 
group,” and does.  But to any ordinary person, it’s just as obvious 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 388 Fallon, supra note 6, at 1277. 
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 392 See Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109, 
1122, 1124–26 (2008). 
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whom “they” refers to in each case — because, as one linguist puts it, 
“of what we know about committees and parades and permitting in 
the real world.”396  To understand language correctly, an interpreter 
needs “a theory of the world,” one that includes not only “committees 
and permits and parades, but apples and honor and schadenfreude 
and love and ambiguity and paradox . . . .”397 
In this sense, Eskridge may well be right that many interpretive 
canons “demand normative analysis” or “normative judicial judgments 
about statutory purpose.”398  And to the extent that normative com-
mitments form part of our theories of the world, judges who make dif-
ferent normative judgments may well interpret the same texts differ-
ently.  But these are “normative” judgments in the sense that they’re 
judgments about norms — particularly those held by other people — 
not in the sense that they involve first-order normative reasoning 
about what is to be done.  As a result, these judgments are very differ-
ent from the kind of ad hoc normative reasoning that Fallon thinks is 
inevitable, such as choosing “the best interpretive outcome as mea-
sured against the normative desiderata of substantive desirability, con-
sistency with rule of law principles, and promotion of political democ-
racy, all things considered.”399  A judge who values these things can’t 
help but be affected thereby, but he or she can also take marching or-
ders primarily from external sources. 
(c)  The Work of Closure Rules. — Even if we’re overly optimistic 
about the volume of indeterminacy, the law of interpretation still has 
useful work to do.  Our interpretive rules include not only individual 
canons, but also the application and closure rules mentioned above.  
For instance, contra proferentem tells uncertain judges which side to 
rule against in a contract dispute; the land-grant canon does the same 
thing in property cases.  And closure rules can be procedural as well as 
substantive.  If one side needs a statute to be clear on a particular is-
sue, they’ll lose if it’s uncertain400 — and if there’s no better answer, 
the plaintiff loses every time.  The very point of these closure rules is 
to tell interpreters what to do when other legal rules don’t. 
It’s true that closure rules might seem arbitrary or harsh in any in-
dividual case.  (That’s rules for you!)  And that’s a good reason to try 
to better understand our law of interpretation.  It’s great if interpreta-
tion can be fair and nonarbitrary, or meet whatever hopes we have for 
it.  But, again, legal interpreters need to know what to do, even if only 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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to know to do nothing.  Closure rules tell them.  They therefore pro-
vide an important bulwark against charges of indeterminacy. 
Of course, there can be uncertainty or disagreement about closure 
rules too.  Once again, though, we think a focus on the law makes it 
easier to close the gap.  For one thing, we don’t need a true consensus 
on individual legal disputes; within a given legal system, there can be 
correct and incorrect views of the law.  That’s why the Supreme Court 
(and Founding-era legislators, for that matter) was able to resolve legal 
disputes as they arose, rather than throwing up their hands and con-
cluding there was no law to apply. 
And disputes about the closure rules can ultimately be resolved by 
particular rules about authority.  The law often layers rules on top of 
rules on top of rules.  As we’ve discussed, when the ordinary legal 
rules run out, we have closure rules to tell us which side wins close 
cases.  And when even the closure rules run out, we have authority 
rules to tell us how to resolve individual disputes — such as a rule that 
five Justices beat four. 
3.  Residual Indeterminacy. — We don’t mean to claim that there 
are no unprovided-for cases in the law of interpretation.  No rule 
crafted by human hands, to handle human affairs, can provide instruc-
tions for avoiding all cases of uncertainty — including uncertainty 
over whether a text is uncertain enough to trigger these instructions, 
and uncertainty over that, and so on.  And there may be some circum-
stances when the whole legal system runs out — for instance, when 
there’s irreconcilable disagreement on the grounds of our legal order.401  
The law of interpretation doesn’t rule out any of these possibilities  
in principle, and we certainly don’t claim to have shown that it does so 
in practice. 
What to do when law is off the table — when one is unbound by 
law, or just unable to determine what the law requires — is beyond 
the scope of this project.  As moral actors, we always in some sense 
have to make the “all things considered” normative judgments that 
Fallon discusses.402  It’s just that usually one big thing to consider, es-
pecially for legal officials, is the law. 
Our disagreement with the skeptics may thus be one of degree.  
But we think it stems from a conceptual disagreement.  A legal in-
strument’s legal effect isn’t entirely a question of language or meaning.  
So it’s a mistake to leap from the indeterminacy of language to the 
conclusion that judges are unbound by law and must do what seems 
best.  Law’s artificial reasons are designed to handle cases for which 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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natural reasons fail to produce agreement.  Indeed, this design is rea-
son for more attention to our law of interpretation — perhaps its set-
tling power can be improved by careful attention to what canons of in-
terpretation are actually established, what closure rules actually mark 
our legal system, and what priority our rules have over one another.  
The law may not supply all the answers, but lawyers ought to be look-
ing for them. 
CONCLUSION 
Everybody knows that in legal interpretation we start with written 
words and somehow end up with law.  The question is what happens 
in between.  Interpretation, we think, has been too obsessed with the 
first and last stages of this process — figuring out the possible linguis-
tic meanings of words, and figuring out what judges should do.  Not 
enough effort has been focused on an important stage in the middle: 
processing written texts through law. 
Once we recognize the importance and ubiquity of the law of inter-
pretation, we can be clearer with ourselves and with each other about 
what we’re doing in any given case — linguistic interpretation, legal 
reasoning, or judicial invention.  And we’ll have many more (and 
hopefully more tractable) resources for distilling law out of the many 
meanings, purposes, and intentions that any one legal instrument can 
have.  We don’t claim to have produced all of the answers here, but 
we hope that we can lead others to ask the right questions. 
